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1307 
FROM CONCEPTION UNTIL BIRTH: 
EXPLORING THE MATERNAL DUTY TO 
PROTECT FETAL HEALTH 
I. INTRODUCTION 
“[I]n health there is liberty. Health is the first of all liberties[.]”1 
 
Kawana was in her third trimester of pregnancy when someone shot 
her in the abdomen in an attempt to kill the child developing within her 
womb.2 Shortly thereafter, paramedics rushed Kawana to the hospital, 
where an emergency surgery saved her life.3 However, the bullet managed 
to obliterate the tiny child’s wrist, and as a result, the doctors were 
required to perform an emergency delivery.4 Kawana’s child grasped on to 
life for fifteen days before dying, its immature life extinguished as a result 
of the premature birth.5  
Likewise, Rena was pregnant when an attacker kicked and stabbed her 
in the abdomen in an attempt to kill her unborn child.6 After the assault, 
paramedics transported Rena to a local hospital where doctors successfully 
treated her life-threatening injuries.7 However, the fetal monitor indicated 
trouble for the unborn child.8 Doctors quickly performed an emergency 
caesarean section in an attempt to save the dying child’s life.9 
Unfortunately, Rena received too great a trauma for the child to 
withstand.10 A medical examiner found that her child lived for only ten 
minutes.11 
Although the facts of these two scenarios were similar, the legal 
outcomes were not. In the first example, the child’s mother fired the gun 
into her own abdomen, attempting to kill her unborn child. In State v. 
Ashley,12 the Florida Supreme Court upheld the common law rule that 
 
 
 1. HENRI-FRÉDÉRIC AMIEL, AMIEL’S JOURNAL: THE JOURNAL INTIME OF HENRI-FRÉDÉRIC 
AMIEL v.1 232 (Mrs. Humphry Ward trans., The Macmillan Company 2d ed. 1907).  
 2. State v. Ashley, 701 So. 2d 338, 339 (Fla. 1997). 
 3. Id.  
 4. Id.  
 5. Id. 
 6. United States v. Spencer, 839 F.2d 1341, 1342 (9th Cir. 1988). 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. 701 So. 2d at 338 (Fla. 1997). 
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provided immunity to a pregnant woman for causing the death of her 
fetus.13 However, in United States v. Spencer,14 because the attacker was 
not the mother, the court reached a different result. Although the child 
survived for only ten minutes, it was considered, as the Spencer court 
articulated, the “killing of a human being.”15 Despite the fact each child 
was born alive in both of these examples, the two cases illustrate a 
discrepancy found in both the United States’ federal and state judicial 
systems regarding the woman and her fetus.16 Namely, even though a third 
party may be held criminally liable for causing injury or death to a fetus, 
the unborn child’s mother may not.17  
The legal duty of a woman to protect the health of her developing fetus 
has become the subject of much controversy as medical advancements 
detail exactly how maternal conduct directly affects fetal health.18 Fueling 
this controversy is society’s growing demand for protection of the 
unborn19 vis-à-vis judicial recognition of women’s constitutional rights in 
reproductive matters.20 Primarily, the controversy over fetal rights centers 
on the large number of women who abuse drugs during pregnancy21 and 
focuses on those children who are subsequently born with AIDS or various 
other medical defects.22 However, the controversy also centers on other 
 
 
 13. Id. at 341. Under the common law, an expectant mother may not be charged with abortion or 
attempted abortion, and therefore the charge of third-degree felony murder failed to set forth a crime 
for the lack of a predicate felony. Id. at 339-40. 
 14. 839 F.2d at 1341.  
 15. Id. at 1343. 
 16. Fetus is defined as “an unborn offspring of a vertebrate animal that is still in the uterus or 
egg, esp[ecially] in its later stages and specif[ically] in humans, from about the eighth week after 
conception until birth[.]” WEBSTERS NEW WORLD COLLEGE DICTIONARY 525 (4th ed. 2000). The 
terms fetus and unborn child will be used interchangeably throughout this Note. 
 17. See generally Alan S. Wasserstrom, Annotation, Homicide Based on Killing of Unborn 
Child, 64 A.L.R.5th 671 (1998).  
 18. Thomas M. Fleming, Annotation, Right of Child to Action Against Mother for Infliction of 
Prenatal Injuries, 78 A.L.R.4th 1082, 1085 (1990).  
 19. See, e.g., Robin Toner, Administration Plans Care Of Fetuses in a Health Plan, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 1, 2002, at A23. (reporting plan to promote prenatal care to low-income mothers by including 
fetuses within health care coverage). President George W. Bush’s administration said the move to 
“clarify” eligibility was an effort to allow states to provide coverage for prenatal care to low-income 
women who might not otherwise receive it. Id. The administration said the program allowed states to 
cover children from conception to age nineteen, thus allowing pregnant women to receive prenatal and 
delivery care. Id.  
 20. Fleming, supra note 18, at 1086-88. See also Part IV discussing the evolution of women’s 
constitutional rights in regards to reproductive matters.  
 21. See Joseph A. Califano, Jr., Substance Abuse and Addiction—The Need to Know, Am. J. Pub. 
Health Editorials (1998), at http://www.apha.org/journal/editorials/edjan8.htm (last visited Jan. 9, 
2003) (noting that “[o]f the 4 million women who give birth each year, some 820,000 smoke 
cigarettes, 760,000 drink alcohol, and 500,000 use illicit drugs during pregnancy”).  
 22. JUDITH LARSEN ET AL., DRUG EXPOSED INFANTS AND THEIR FAMILIES: COORDINATING 
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harmful activities such as inadequate maternal nutrition, immoderate 
exercise, and sexual activity late in pregnancy,23 which may also injure the 
fetus.24  
In response to these problems, prosecutors and judges in numerous 
states have begun to apply child abuse,25 neglect, support, endangerment, 
and homicide statutes in an attempt to “deter, punish, or remedy” maternal 
conduct during pregnancy deemed “harmful” to the unborn child.26 
Furthermore, many prosecutors and judges have relied on statutory 
authority when requiring pregnant women to undergo medical procedures 
thought “necessary to preserve fetal life or health.”27 
 
 
RESPONSES OF THE LEGAL, MEDICAL AND CHILD PROTECTION SYSTEM 45 (1990). See also Fleming, 
supra note 18, at 1085 (noting that intravenous drug use by pregnant women has given rise to babies 
born with AIDS).  
 23. See, e.g., People v. Stewart, No. M508197, slip op. (San Diego Mun. Ct. Cal. Feb. 26, 1987) 
(charging woman with fetal neglect for failing to heed doctor’s advice not to have sex with her 
husband while pregnant). Angela Bonavoglia, The Ordeal of Pamela Rae Stewart, MS., Aug. 1987, at 
92, 95. 
 24. See Fleming, supra note 18, at 1085 (citing Carol Ann Simon, Note, Parental Liability For 
Prenatal Injury, 14 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 47 (1978)). 
 25. See, e.g., Whitner v. South Carolina, 492 S.E.2d 777 (S.C. 1997) (holding that the word 
“child” as used in the child abuse and endangerment statute includes viable fetuses). Finding that a 
viable fetus is a person for purposes of the child endangerment statute, the court reasoned: “[I]t would 
be absurd to recognize the viable fetus as a person for purposes of homicide laws and wrongful death 
statutes but not for purposes proscribing child abuse.” Id. at 780. The mother in Whitner contended 
that several bills introduced in the South Carolina General Assembly addressing the specific issue of 
criminalizing prenatal substance abuse evidenced the legislature’s lack of intent to include viable 
fetuses as persons under the child abuse and neglect statutes. Id. at 781. The court rejected this 
contention, finding that an evaluation of legislative intent was unnecessary because the language of the 
statute and South Carolina case law clearly supported a finding that a viable fetus is a person for 
purposes of criminal statutes. Id. Thus, South Carolina became the first state to have its highest court 
uphold a conviction based on a mother’s use of illegal drugs during pregnancy. Regina M. Coady, 
Extending Child Abuse Protection to the Viable Fetus: Whitner v. State of South Carolina, 71 ST. 
JOHN’S L. REV. 667, 678 n.50 (1997).  
 26. Fleming, supra note 18, at 1985. 
 27. Id. See also Kathleen Rauscher, Comment, Fetal Surgery: A Developing Legal Dilemma, 31 
ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 775, 778 (1987) (noting that some fetal defects, if not treated in utero, may cause 
substantial, permanent harm without causing death); see also Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County 
Hosp. Auth., 274 S.E.2d 457 (Ga. 1981) (authorizing plaintiff hospital to perform a caesarean section 
and any necessary blood transfusions upon the mother in the event she presented herself to the hospital 
for delivery of her unborn child); Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Mem’l. Hosp. v. Anderson, 201 A.2d 
537 (N.J. 1964) (compelling defendant mother to receive blood transfusions to save the life of her 
unborn child).  
 Another approach states have taken to preserve fetal health is through their parens patriae powers. 
Drago, infra note 109, at 170. See also Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1943) (recognizing 
the ability of the state through it’s parens patriae power to limit parental freedom and authority in 
matters concerning a child’s welfare). When an individual lacks the capacity to act in his or her own 
best interest, the state may use this common law power to exercise a paternalistic power over that 
individual. Id. (citation omitted). For example, the state has an “express obligation” to exercise its 
power over a physically or mentally abused minor and thus assume the role of the child’s protector. Id. 
(citing In re Phillip B., 92 Cal. App. 3d 796 (1979) (stating that the state has a right to protect 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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This Note focuses on the ignited controversy centered on the nature 
and extent of a woman’s legal duty for the protection and health of her 
unborn child.28 Part II addresses the historical developments of fetal rights 
specifically in the areas of tort law and in criminal law. Part III examines 
the medical effects of teratogens29 on the developing fetus. Part IV focuses 
on the constitutional obstacles facing protection for unborn children, 
namely the balance between a woman’s right to procreational autonomy 
and privacy and the state’s compelling interest in protecting the life and 
health of an unborn child. Part V examines the advantages and 
disadvantages of state intervention during a woman’s pregnancy and of the 
criminalization of maternal conduct. Finally, Part VI proposes that state 
and federal governments enact legislation to penalize egregious prenatal 
behavior while implementing effective support programs aimed at 
promoting maternal health education and providing necessary treatment 
centers for addicted pregnant women.  
II. BACKGROUND AND HISTORY OF FETAL RIGHTS 
A. The Development of Fetal Rights in Tort Law and the Fall of Parental 
Immunity  
Although courts established the theory of liability for prenatal injury to 
an unborn child over a century ago,30 most courts are only beginning to 
determine whether they should recognize such a cause of action when the 
unborn child’s mother causes the injury.31 Courts have increasingly 
 
 
children)).  
 28. The goal of this Note will be to address why federal and local governments should compel a 
woman, who has decided to carry her fetus to term, to refrain from certain conduct that is likely to 
harm her unborn child. Although there remains much controversy regarding state intervention directly 
after birth, such as with breast-feeding by a drug-addicted mother and neonatal drug dependency, this 
Note focuses solely on state intervention during pregnancy and not on any negligence claims that may 
arise thereafter.  
 29. A teratogen is “an agent, as a chemical, or disease, that causes malformation of a fetus[.]” 
WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD COLLEGE DICTIONARY 1477 (4th ed. 2000).  
 30. See Allaire v. St. Luke’s Hosp., 56 N.E. 638 (Ill. 1900), overruled by Amann v. Faidy, 114 
N.E.2d 412 (Ill. 1953) (allowing expectant mother to recover for injuries sustained to her fetus in 
hospital elevator accident). 
 31. Fleming, supra note 18, at 1085. Protection of fetuses has been most visible in recent years in 
the civil abuse context. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, § 51A (West 1993 and Supp. 2002) 
(including children “determined to be physically dependent upon an addictive drug at birth” within 
abuse statute); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4C-11 (West 1997 and Supp. 2002) (protecting unborn through 
endangerment provisions); In re Troy D., 263 Cal. Rptr. 869 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (interpreting child 
abuse and neglect statutes to cover amphetamine and opiate use during pregnancy); In re Baby X, 293 
N.W.2d 736 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980) (finding that abuse and neglect statutes include heroin use while 
pregnant); In re Stefanel Tyesha, 556 N.Y.S.2d 280 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990) (interpreting statutes to 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol80/iss4/6
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grappled with the subject of whether a woman has a maternal duty to 
guarantee the health of her fetus.32 As a result of these decisions, prenatal 
tort liability has now developed, primarily during the last few decades, to 
the point where children may now bring personal injury actions against 
their mothers for harmful prenatal conduct.33 At the core of these personal 
injury actions is the belief that a child has a “legal right to begin life 
unimpaired by physical or mental defects caused by another’s 
negligence.”34  
Moreover, during the past thirty years, most courts have nullified the 
rule of “parental immunity,” which barred an unemancipated minor from 
bringing a tort action against his or her parent.35 Those courts that were 
 
 
include daily marijuana use while pregnant); In re Fathima Ashanti K.J., 558 N.Y.S.2d 447 (N.Y. 
Fam. Ct. 1990) (interpreting statutes to include abuse to fetuses); Dep’t of Soc. Servs. ex rel. Mark S. 
v. Felicia B., 543 N.Y.S.2d 637 (N.Y. Fam Ct. 1989) (finding abuse and neglect statues include 
cocaine use while pregnant); In re Smith, 492 N.Y.S.2d 331, 337 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1985) (including 
excessive drinking during pregnancy under child abuse and neglect statutes); In re Ruiz, 27 Ohio Misc. 
2d 31 (1986) (interpreting abuse and neglect statutes to include heroin use while pregnant). 
 32. See Grodin v. Grodin, where the court considered a child’s claim that his mother’s negligent 
use of tetracycline while pregnant caused him to develop discolored teeth after birth. 301 N.W.2d 869 
(Mich. Ct. App. 1980). The court reasoned that a child is entitled to compensation from anyone 
wrongfully interfering with his “right to begin life with a sound mind and body.” Id. at 870. The court 
ruled that a mother may be held liable for injury to her child born alive, resulting from her negligence 
during pregnancy, if the injurious conduct is not protected by parent-child tort immunity. Id. However, 
Stallman v. Youngquist involved injury to a child allegedly caused by its mother’s negligent operation 
of a car while pregnant. 531 N.E.2d 355 (Ill. 1988). The court held that a child born alive has no cause 
of action against its mother for prenatal injury she unintentionally inflicted upon it. Id. at 361 
(emphasis added). The court found that such liability would involve excessive legal interference in the 
uniquely intimate relationship between a mother and her fetus at the expense of the mother’s privacy 
and autonomy rights. Courts might not be able to apply this kind of liability fairly among all pregnant 
women in their varying socioeconomic circumstances. Id. at 359-61. 
 33. Fleming, supra note 18, at 1086-87. See also Bonte v. Bonte, 616 A.2d 464 (N.H. 1992) 
(providing that child born alive has cause of action against his or her mother for mother’s negligent 
conduct that results in prenatal injuries); Grodin, 301 N.W.2d at 869 (finding that tetracycline ingested 
during pregnancy resulted in discolored teeth in child), disagreed with on other grounds by Thelen v. 
Thelen, 435 N.W.2d 495 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989). 
 34. Fleming, supra note 18, at 1085. The vast majority of courts have vacated the contrasting 
rule that was prevalent before 1946. Id. at 1086. Today most courts hold that a child born alive may 
recover damages for prenatal injuries tortiously inflicted upon it by a third person. Id. See also 
ETHICAL ISSUES IN MATERNAL-FETAL MEDICINE 131-46 (Donna L. Dickenson ed., Cambridge 
University Press 2002) (advocating restrictions on the freedoms of pregnant women).  
 Additionally, physicians are not immune from liability for tortious prenatal injury to a fetus. See 
Renslow v. Mennonite Hosp., 367 N.E.2d 1250 (Ill. 1977) (discussing a right to be born free from 
prenatal injuries foreseeably caused by a breach of physician’s duty to child’s mother); Ellig v. Delnor 
Cmty. Hosp., 603 N.E.2d 1203 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (finding obstetrician was sole proximate cause of 
undiagnosed twin’s injuries resulting in death); Peters v. Vander Kooi 494 N.W.2d 708, 712-13 (Iowa 
1993) (finding physician who ordered Pitocin to stimulate progress of labor allegedly was negligent in 
not assuring availability of physician who could perform cesarian section in the event of fetal distress). 
 35. Fleming, supra note 18, at 1086. See also 59 AM. JUR. 2D Parent and Child § 148 (1987) 
(stating that “the modern inclination is to regard the minor’s damage action against parent . . . as 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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reluctant to tread down the path of parental immunity abrogation instead 
curtailed the immunity. Those courts either carved out exceptions for 
negligent automobile operation,36 claims covered by insurance,37 or limited 
immunity to injuries resulting from the “exercise of parental authority or 
discretion.”38 Some commentators endorse the imposition of prenatal tort 
liability on women as a means of “promoting fetal health by discouraging 
maternal conduct detrimental thereto.”39 However, other commentators40 
 
 
maintainable where the injury or death was intentional or resulted from willful misconduct or an evil 
mind, whether or not characterized as malice”).  
 36. See, e.g., Cates v. Cates, 619 N.E.2d 715 (Ill. 1993) (concluding that the negligent operation 
of an automobile was not conduct inherent to the parent-child relationship and the doctrine did not bar 
the child’s negligence action); Nocktonick v. Nocktonick, 611 P.2d 135 (Kan. 1980) (holding that 
unemancipated minor may recover damages in an action against a parent for injuries allegedly caused 
by the negligence of the parent in the operation of an insured motor vehicle); Black v. Solmitz, 409 
A.2d 634 (Me. 1979) (holding that negligent automobile actions should not be dismissed on the ground 
of parental immunity); France v. A.P.A Trans. Corp., 267 A.2d 490 (N.J. 1970) (upholding the validity 
of abrogating immunity as to vehicle accidents); Guess v. Gulf Ins. Co., 627 P.2d 869 (N.M. 1981) 
(holding that a negligent-automobile-operation suit may be maintained between a child and his or her 
representative and the parents or their personal representative); Nuelle v. Wells, 154 N.W.2d 364 
(N.D. 1967) (permitting an unemancipated minor to have a claim against his parents in automobile 
negligence claim); Unah v. Martin, 676 P.2d 1366 (Okla. 1984) (qualifying the rule of parental 
immunity to allow an action for negligence arising from an automobile accident brought on behalf of 
an unemancipated minor child against a parent); Winn v. Gilroy, 681 P.2d 776 (Or. 1984) (maintaining 
a mother’s cause of action against her husband for the wrongful death of their children, which occurred 
in an automobile accident); Silva v. Silva, 446 A.2d 1013 (R.I. 1982) (allowing an automobile tort 
action between a parent and her unemancipated minor child); Merrick v. Sutterlin, 610 P.2d 891 
(Wash. 1980) (concluding that child, as well as other children, who were injured by the negligence of a 
parent in an automobile accident had a cause of action against that parent); Lee v. Corner, 224 S.E.2d 
721 (W. Va. 1976) (ruling that the parental immunity doctrine did not preclude personal injury actions 
by unemancipated minors against their parents for injuries sustained in motor vehicle accidents).  
 37. See, e.g., Myers v. Robertson, 891 P.2d 199 (Alaska 1995) (affirming that in a suit against 
the mother brought by a child, the insurance company is the real party in interest); Ard v. Ard, 414 So. 
2d 1066 (Fla. 1982) (holding that parental immunity was waived where liability insurance was 
available to ease the financial difficulties that resulted when a parent caused injury to a child); Farmers 
Ins. Group v. Reed, 712 P.2d 550 (Idaho 1985) (concluding that damages in intrafamily actions were 
limited to the limits of the automobile liability insurance policy); Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Royle, 656 
P.2d 820 (Mont. 1983) (sustaining plaintiff’s obligation to defend or provide coverage for defendant 
parents who were being sued by their minor daughter who was injured in an automobile accident while 
a passenger in her mother’s car); Jilani v. Jilani, 767 S.W.2d 671 (Tex. 1988) (holding that driving an 
automobile was not an exercise of parental authority or an exercise of discretion in providing for the 
care and necessities of a child and an automobile tort action brought by an unemancipated child 
against a parent was outside of the scope of the doctrine of parental immunity); Smith v. Kauffman, 
183 S.E.2d 190 (Va. 1971) (finding that the rule of parental immunity was anachronistic based upon 
the high incidence of liability insurance coverage in the state).  
 38. Fleming, supra note 18, at 1086. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895G(1) 
(1979) (clarifying that the “parent or child is not immune from tort liability to the other solely by 
reason of that relationship”). 
 39. Fleming, supra note 18, at 1086.  
 40. See, e.g., Dawn Johnsen, Shared Interests: Promoting Healthy Births Without Sacrificing 
Women’s Liberty, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 569 (1992) (stating that if not formulated with care, governmental 
policies adopted to promote healthy births can lead to significant and unnecessary intrusions on 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol80/iss4/6
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condemn such measures as “impractical” and “unacceptable” 
encroachments on a pregnant woman’s right to privacy, autonomy, and 
bodily integrity in procreational matters, as acknowledged in Roe v. 
Wade41 and its progeny.42  
B. Born Alive Rule, Wrongful Death, and Viability 
In general, when an injured fetus is born alive, the child or those acting 
on behalf of the child may maintain an action to recover damages for 
negligently inflicted prenatal injuries caused by third parties.43 
Furthermore, some courts hold that it is irrelevant whether the injuries 
occurred at the gestational stage or whether the fetus was viable at the time 
of the injuries.44 For example, the administrator of the estate of a dead 
 
 
women’s fundamental liberties); Christa J. Richer, Note, Fetal Abuse Law: Punitive Approach and the 
Honorable Status of Motherhood, 50 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1127 (2000) (prosecuting expectant mothers 
may promulgate a patriarchal society). 
 41. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 42. Fleming, supra note 18, at 1086. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, where the Court 
affirmed, inter alia, that a woman has the right to choose to have an abortion before her fetus is viable 
and to obtain an abortion without undue interference from a state. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). The Court 
stated that a state has the power to restrict abortions after fetal viability, if the state law imposing such 
a restriction contains exceptions for pregnancies which endanger a woman’s life or health. Id. In 
addition, the court motioned that a state has legitimate interests from the outset of a pregnancy in 
protecting the health of the pregnant woman and the life of the fetus that may become a child. Id. But 
see Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, where the Court concluded that the trimester framework 
established in Roe was unduly rigid and should be abandoned. 492 U.S. 490 (1989). The Webster 
Court however, stopped short of holding that a fetus is a “person” under the Fourteenth Amendment. 
LARSEN, supra note 22, at 31.  
 43. 62A AM. JUR. 2D Prenatal Injuries; Wrongful Life, Birth or Conception § 8 (2000).  
 44. 2 STEIN ON PERSONAL INJURY DAMAGES TREATISE § 12:13 (3d ed. 2002). See also Simon v. 
Mullin, 380 A.2d 1353, 1357 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1977) (allowing recovery by or on behalf of a child 
born alive for prenatal injuries suffered at any time after conception without regard to the viability of 
the fetus); Day v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 328 So. 2d 560 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976) (maintaining 
negligence action by a minor for prenatal injuries suffered during the sixth week of gestation); 
Hornbuckle v. Plantation Pipe Line Co., 93 S.E.2d 727 (Ga. 1956) (holding child born after receiving 
tortious injury at any period after conception had cause of action for prenatal injuries regardless of 
whether they were sustained while he was an embryo or fetus); Renslow, 367 N.E.2d at 1250 
(discussing a right to be born free from prenatal injuries foreseeably caused by a breach of physician’s 
duty to child’s mother); Daley v. Meier, 178 N.E.2d 691 (Ill. App. Ct. 1961) (finding infant who was 
born alive and survived could maintain action to recover for prenatal injuries resulting from negligence 
of another even though infant had not reached state of viability at time of injury); Bennett v. Hymers, 
147 A.2d 108 (N.H. 1958) (holding that infant born alive may maintain an action to recover prenatal 
injuries inflicted upon it by the tort of another even though fetus was not viable at time of injury); 
Smith v. Brennan, 157 A.2d 497 (N.J. 1960) (finding no reason for denying recovery for a prenatal 
injury that occurred before the infant was capable of a separate existence); Kelly v. Gregory, 125 
N.Y.S.2d 696 (N.Y. App. Div. 1953) (holding legal entity of child begins at conception and that a 
child, born alive, may recover for prenatal injury tortiously inflicted at any time after conception, 
regardless of fetal viability at time of injury); Sylvia v. Gobeille, 220 A.2d 222 (R.I. 1966) (holding 
child born alive has a right of action in tort against a negligent wrongdoer for prenatal injuries). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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infant who was “born alive” may generally bring a state claim for 
wrongful death against its mother’s tortfeasor.45 In the legal realm, 
allowing recovery for prenatal injury to a fetus later born alive has become 
the “universal” rule.46 For instance, during the last fifty years, virtually all 
jurisdictions have recognized tort actions against third parties for the 
infliction of prenatal injuries when the child is subsequently born alive.47  
 
 
 45. See infra notes 49-56 and accompanying text.  
 46. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 869(1) cmt. a. (1979). “The earlier decisions on 
prenatal injuries . . . denied all recovery.” Id. The rationale was that because the person was not yet in 
existence there could be no duty owed and the causal connection would be too great a problem thereby 
posing the danger of unfounded claims. Id. However, legal commentators attacked these decisions, 
arguing that the unborn child is a legal entity in other areas of the law. Id. In those other areas of the 
law such as property law and criminal law, there were no difficulties of proof. Id. Furthermore, there 
were no more frequent and no greater challenges of proof than in cases of many other medical 
problems. Id.  
 47. See, e.g., Wolfe v. Isbell, 280 So. 2d 758 (Ala. 1973) (upholding action maintained for 
wrongful death arising from injury to an unborn child, whether or not the fetal child was viable when 
the injury was inflicted, if the child is subsequently born alive and dies from the injury); Scott v. 
McPheeters, 92 P.2d 678 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1939) (stating that child could maintain malpractice suit 
against physician for injuries sustained by the child before its birth by the alleged “negligent use of 
metal clamps and forceps incident to the delivery of the child”); Prates v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 118 
A.2d 633 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1955) (finding that decedent who sustained injuries en ventre sa mere, 
would have had right of action for such injuries if she had lived); Worgan v. Greggo & Ferrara, Inc., 
128 A.2d 557 (Del. Super. Ct. 1956) (holding that administrator of viable infant killed by negligence 
had right of action against wrongdoer); Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.C. 1946) (holding that 
child injured in process of removal from its mother’s womb by defendants’ alleged professional 
malpractice was a viable child and had standing in court to maintain action for its injury, and could not 
be denied recovery on ground that it was merely a part of its mother); Day, 328 So.2d at 560 (“[A] 
child born alive, having suffered prenatal injuries at any time after conception, had a cause of action 
against the alleged tortfeasor.”); Tucker v. Howard L. Carmichael & Sons, Inc., 65 S.E.2d 909 (Ga. 
1951) (stating that infant could maintain an action for prenatal injuries allegedly caused by defendant’s 
negligent operation of ambulance); Rodriquez v. Patti, 114 N.E.2d 721 (Ill. 1953) (finding that while 
infant was an infant en ventre sa mere, through his mother and next friend, had cause of action for 
injuries); Wendt v. Lillo, 182 F. Supp. 56 (N.D. Iowa 1960) (maintaining action for death of unborn 
child from injuries received in automobile collision); Hale v. Manion, 368 P.2d 1 (Kan. 1962) 
(allowing parents to maintain action for wrongful death of viable unborn child resulting from negligent 
acts of taxicab company); Orange v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 443 S.W.2d 650, 651 (Ky. 1969) 
(ruling that a viable unborn child of insured was a legal “person” with a separate existence of its own 
and was member of class excluded from coverage by “family” or “household” exclusion clause of 
automobile liability policy); Cooper v. Blanck, 39 So. 2d 352 (La. Ct. App. 1923) (holding that a 
viable fetus capable of sustaining independent existence, including a fetus en ventre sa mere in ninth 
month of gestation, is a “child” for whose negligent killing an action may be maintained); 
Damasiewicz v. Gorsuch, 79 A.2d 550 (Md. 1951) (allowing child injured in automobile accident 
while en ventre sa mere that was prematurely born permanently blind in both eyes because of the 
accident to recover from drivers of automobiles for such injuries in the event that the drivers were 
negligent); Keyes v. Constr. Serv. Inc., 165 N.E.2d 912 (Mass. 1960) (finding that where a child in 
utero is so far advanced in prenatal age as that child could live separable from the mother, child has a 
right of action for any injuries wantonly or negligently inflicted upon his or her person at such age of 
viability); Womack v. Buckhorn, 187 N.W.2d 218 (Mich. 1971) (holding common-law negligence 
action could be brought on behalf of an eight-year-old surviving child for prenatal brain injuries 
suffered during the fourth month of the pregnancy in an automobile accident); Verkennes v. Corniea, 
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The Connecticut Superior Court in Simon v. Mullin48 supports the 
“well-established trend”49 that allows recovery on behalf of a child born 
alive for prenatal injuries inflicted at “any time of the pregnancy.”50 In 
Simon, a car accident caused the injury to the four-month old fetus.51 For 
two months after the accident, the mother experienced intermittent vaginal 
bleeding and ultimately suffered from a rupture of her membranes, which 
resulted in the baby’s premature birth.52 In a case of first impression, the 
 
 
38 N.W.2d 838 (Minn. 1949) (stating that representative of viable unborn child capable of separate 
and independent existence, whose death was allegedly caused by wrongful acts or omission of 
physician in charge of mother and of hospital in which she was confined, could maintain action); 
Rainey v. Horn, 72 So. 2d 434 (Miss. 1954) (allowing recovery for viable unborn child that died 
before birth as the result of the negligent act of another); Steggall v. Morris, 258 S.W.2d 577 (Mo. 
1953) (holding that viable child who sustained prenatal injuries from which he died a few days after 
birth, was a person within meaning of wrongful death statute under which person responsible for such 
injuries would be liable to parents in damages for death of child); White v. Yup, 458 P.2d 617 (Nev. 
1969) (maintaining cause of action for wrongful death of the unborn eight-month-old fetus which had 
been viable at time of injury but was stillborn as a result of the injury); Bennett v. Hymers, 147 A.2d 
108 (N.H. 1958) (ruling that infant born alive can maintain an action to recover prenatal injuries 
inflicted upon it by the tort of another even if the infant had not become a viable fetus at time of 
injury); Smith v. Brennan, 157 A.2d 497 (N.J. 1960) (permitting recovery for injuries sustained by the 
infant plaintiff while in the womb of his mother when injured in an automobile collision caused by the 
defendant’s negligence); Woods v. Lancet, 102 N.E.2d 691 (N.Y. 1951) (stating that child tortiously 
injured during the ninth month of his mother’s pregnancy, while existing as a viable fetus, and later 
born, is entitled to recover for such injury); Williams v. Marion Rapid Transit Co., 87 N.E.2d 334 
(Ohio 1949) (finding that injuries wrongfully inflicted upon a viable unborn child that was capable of 
existing independently of the mother subsequent to his birth, presented a cause of action); Mallison v. 
Pomeroy, 291 P.2d 225 (Or. 1955) (holding that plaintiff, who suffered injuries while in womb of 
mother during her sixth month of pregnancy at time of accident, had cause of action for the prenatal 
injuries against motorist whose automobile allegedly negligently crashed into rear of automobile in 
which mother was seated); Sinkler v. Kneale, 164 A.2d 93 (Pa. 1960) (finding that child, who was 
born Mongoloid as result of injuries received in an automobile collision when the child was a one 
month old fetus had a right to recover); Sylvia v. Gobeille, 220 A.2d at 222 (holding that a child born 
alive has a right of action in tort against a negligent wrongdoer for prenatal injuries); Hall v. Murphy, 
113 S.E.2d 790 (S.C. 1960) (stating that a fetus having reached that period of prenatal maturity where 
it is capable of independent life apart from its mother is a person and if such a child is injured, it may 
maintain an action for injuries after birth); Shousha v. Matthews Drivurself Serv., Inc., 358 S.W.2d 
471 (Tenn. 1962) (holding where infants were viable, parents could prosecute suits for injuries and 
death); Leal v. C.C. Pitts Sand & Gravel, Inc., 419 S.W.2d 820 (Tex. 1967) (stating that where child 
was born alive but died two days later as result of prenatal injuries suffered when the mother was 
involved in an automobile-truck collision, parents had cause of action for wrongful death of child 
against truck operator); Seattle First Nat. Bank v. Rankin, 367 P.2d 835 (Wash. 1962) (maintaining 
cause of action in favor of child against defendant physician for negligence in the care of plaintiff’s 
mother during pregnancy and in delivery of child born with cerebral palsy); Kwaterski v. State Farm 
Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 148 N.W.2d 107, 112 (Wis. 1967) (finding “viable infant who receives injury and 
is stillborn is ‘person’ within meaning of (wrongful death statute) so as to give rise to wrongful death 
action by parents of stillborn infant”).  
 48. Simon, 380 A.2d at 1353. 
 49. 62A AM. JUR. 2D Prenatal Injuries; Wrongful Life, Birth or Conception § 18 (2000).  
 50. Simon, 380 A.2d at 1356. 
 51. Id. at 1354. 
 52. Id. 
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court analyzed the issue of whether the administrator of a child’s estate 
may recover for prenatal injury to a nonviable fetus.53 Answering in the 
affirmative, the court held that the administrator could recover for prenatal 
injuries sustained at any time after conception, “irrespective of viability.”54 
The rule therefore, is that if the child is born alive, and if the plaintiff can 
satisfactorily establish the tortious conduct and legal cause of the harm, he 
or she may recover for any prenatal injury occurring “any time after 
conception.”55 However, despite this well-established recognition that a 
child born alive may bring a tort claim for prenatal injuries negligently 
caused by third parties, only a minority of courts have extended civil 
liability to the mother of the child born alive.56 
As previously mentioned, in those cases brought by or on behalf of a 
child for prenatal injuries, there exists an implied condition that the injured 
unborn child be born alive before liability attaches.57 However, if the 
unborn child dies and was viable at the time of the tortious prenatal 
injuries, a majority of states allow recovery under the applicable wrongful 
death statute.58 Although all fifty states have wrongful death statutes,59 the 
question of whether to permit recovery for the wrongful death of a viable 
 
 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 1357. 
 55. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 869 cmt. d. Furthermore, “[t]he rule stated . . . is not 
limited to unborn children who are ‘viable’ at the time of the original injury, that is, capable of 
independent life, if only in an incubator.” Id. 
 56. See, e.g., National Cas. Co. v. Northern Trust Bank of Fla., N.A., 807 So. 2d 86 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 2001) (holding that a mother may be held liable for prenatal negligence that led to an 
automobile accident, causing injury to the fetus); Bonte, 616 A.2d at 464 (holding that child born alive 
has cause of action against his or her mother for mother’s negligent conduct that results in prenatal 
injuries). The Bonte court reasoned that because a “child born alive may maintain a cause of action 
against another for injuries sustained while in utero, and a child may sue his or her mother in tort for 
the mother’s negligence, it follows that a child born alive has a cause of action against his or her 
mother for the mother’s negligence that caused injury to the child when in utero.” Id. at 466. See also 
Grodin, 301 N.W.2d at 869 (ruling that tetracycline ingested during pregnancy resulted in discolored 
teeth in child for which the mother was civilly liable).  
 57. 62A AM JUR. 2D. Prenatal Injuries; Wrongful Life, Birth or Conception § 8 (2000). See also 
supra notes 43-47 and accompanying text.  
 58. 19 AM. JUR. POF 3D 107 Wrongful Death of Fetus § 1 (1993) (emphasis added). Under the 
common law, no cause of action existed for the wrongful death of any individual and as a result, it was 
cheaper for the defendant to kill the plaintiff than to injure him. 19 AM. JUR. POF 3D 107 § 4. Hoping 
to rectify this iniquity, state legislatures enacted wrongful death statutes with the purpose of providing 
a cause action against those whose tortious conduct destroys human life while compensating those 
who were injured as a result of the wrongful death of another and protecting human life. The 
deterrence of dangerous conduct another purpose. Id. This rationale makes sense from a biological and 
legal standpoint, because a viable unborn child is not merely a part of its mother. Sheldon R. Shapiro, 
Annotation, Right to Maintain Action or to Recover Damages for Death of Unborn Child, 84 A.L.R.3d 
411 § 2(a) (2001).  
 59. 19 AM. JUR. POF 3D, supra note 58, § 4 (citing PROSSER & KEETON, ON THE LAW OF 
TORTS § 127 (5th ed. 1984)).  
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but unborn child depends on statutory interpretation.60 Most courts have 
held that “a viable unborn child is a ‘person’ or ‘individual’” according to 
their wrongful death statutes.61 Conversely, a large minority of state courts 
deny recovery on the ground that the legislature did not intend the 
wrongful death statute to apply to these kinds of cases.62 These courts have 
relied on reasoning such as: an unborn child is not a distinct legal 
personality; compensation for injuries to the mother is adequate; the right 
to maintain a wrongful death action should depend on the child being born 
alive; and proof of causation and damages are too difficult to determine 
when a child dies before being born.63 
However, in the absence of statutory authority, some jurisdictions have 
permitted the parents to recover based upon the wrongful infliction of 
emotional distress even though the legislature may have technically 
 
 
 60. Id. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 869(2) (stating “[I]f the child is not born 
alive, there is no liability unless the applicable wrongful death statute so provides.”). 
 61. 19 AM. JUR. POF 3D 107 § 4. The holding in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services 
supports the viewpoint that a viable unborn child is a “person” or “individual” within the meaning of 
the wrongful death statutes. Id. (citing Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. at 490). The Court 
recognized that the states’ compelling interest in protecting the lives of viable unborn children is 
“expanding in favor of added protections.” Id. at 561. The Webster Court went on to say that if the 
state’s interest in protecting the health of an unborn child is compelling at the point of viability, then it 
is equally compelling before viability, and, in fact, throughout gestation. Id. The plurality noted that it 
did not understand why the state’s interest in protecting potential human life should come into 
existence “only at the point of viability.” Id. Therefore, the Court noted, it is unclear why there is a 
“rigid line allowing state regulation after viability but prohibiting it before viability.” Id.  
 62. See, e.g., Mace v. Jung, 210 F. Supp. 706 (D. Alaska 1962) (barring recovery under Alaska 
wrongful death statute for death of nonviable unborn child as result of automobile collision); Kilmer v. 
Hicks, 529 P.2d 706 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1974) (finding “person” within purview of statute providing for 
recovery of damages when “death of a person is caused by wrongful act,” is clear and unambiguous in 
its noninclusion of viable fetus); Justus v. Atchison, 565 P.2d 122 (Cal. 1977) (holding wrongful death 
action could not be maintained for death of stillborn fetus, in view of fact that a fetus is not a “person” 
within meaning of wrongful death statute); Stern v. Miller, 348 So. 2d 303 (Fla. 1977) (stating that 
fetus, which was alleged to have been viable and to have been fatally injured by defendant’s 
negligence, was not a “person” for purposes of wrongful death statute); Toth v. Goree, 237 N.W.2d 
297 (Mich. Ct. App. 1975) (concluding that nonviable three month old infant, not born alive, was not 
“person” within meaning of wrongful death statute); Drabbels v. Skelly Oil Co., 50 N.W.2d 229 (Neb. 
1951) (stating that deceased could not have maintained an action at common law for injuries received 
by it while in its mother’s womb, because it was born dead); Graf v. Taggert, 204 A.2d 140 (N.J. 
1964) (finding there can be no right of recovery for wrongful death of unborn child); In re Logan’s 
Estate, 144 N.E.2d 644 (N.Y. 1957) (holding action for wrongful death with respect to estate of 
stillborn child after mother was injured in automobile accident occurring during her pregnancy was not 
covered under wrongful death statute); Marko v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 216 A.2d 502 (Pa. 1966) 
(barring recovery by administrator of estate on behalf of viable fetus that was stillborn under wrongful 
death statute); Hogan v. McDaniel, 319 S.W.2d 221 (Tenn. 1958) (finding an unborn viable child 
developed during nine months of pregnancy, alive and capable of existence separate and apart from its 
mother, was not a “person” within contemplation of wrongful death statutes); Lawrence v. Craven Tire 
Co., 169 S.E.2d 440 (Va. 1969) (barring right of action under wrongful death statutes for death of 
unborn viable child).  
 63. Shapiro, supra note 58, § 2(a).  
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rejected recovery for the wrongful death of a fetus.64 A slightly larger 
number of courts have construed their statutes to permit recovery for 
wrongful death even if the child is stillborn.65 In fact, a few states have 
allowed recovery for tortious conduct that occurred before the child’s 
conception.66  
C. From Feticide67 to Fetal Abuse: The Unborn Child in Criminal Law 
Whether courts may convict the slayer of a fetus under homicide 
statutes has been the subject of controversy for many years.68 At common 
law and in the absence of a statute, there is no crime if a child dies before 
birth.69 However, under many state statutes today, if the child is born alive 
and later dies, the culpability is the same as that incurred in the killing of 
any other human being.70 The rationale being that a child who has an 
“independent existence” separate from his or her mother is a human 
being.71 The common law further distinguishes fetal life before and after 
the period of “quickening,” which generally occurs between the sixth and 
eighth week of pregnancy.72  
 
 
 64. See, e.g., Parvin v. Dean, 7 S.W.3d 264 (Tex. Ct. App. 1999) (finding that there is no 
compelling state interest in a gender-based denial of a father’s right to recover damages for his own 
mental anguish from the negligently caused loss of his viable fetus).  
 65. See, e.g., Verkennes v. Corniea, 38 N.W.2d 838 (Minn. 1949) (allowing recovery when the 
child died during birth); Rainey v. Horn, 72 So. 2d 434 (Miss. 1954) (allowing recovery when forced 
birth resulted in death of child). 
 66. See, e.g., Bergstreser v. Mitchell, 577 F.2d 22 (8th Cir. 1978) (allowing recovery for injury 
caused by negligent performance of caesarian on mother for earlier child); Renslow, 367 N.E.2d at 
1250 (holding as negligent the transfusion of RH-negative blood into woman with RH-positive blood, 
years before conception); Monusko v. Postle, 437 N.W.2d 367 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989) (allowing 
recovery for child after doctors negligently failed to immunize mother for rubella before she 
conceived).  
 67. Feticide is defined as the “act or an instance of killing a fetus, usually by assaulting and 
battering the mother; an intentionally induced miscarriage.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 636 (7th ed. 
1999). 
 68. Wasserstrom, supra note 17, at 671.  
 69. Id. 
 70. Id.  
 71. Id. See also 40 AM. JUR. 2D, Homicide § 9 (1999) (finding existence to occur only seconds 
after birth).  
 72. Wasserstrom, supra note 17, at 686 (citing Abrams v. Foshee, 3 Clarke 274 (1856), which 
stated “that there was no crime of abortion at common law”). At common law, causing the death of an 
unborn child after quickening was legally regarded as “a great misprision,” that is, a misdemeanor, and 
not homicide, and that causing a miscarriage before quickening was not a punishable offense. Id. One 
reason for this distinction was that it was too difficult to determine the cause of death of the infant. Id. 
Whether the child was capable of maintaining its existence apart from the mother’s body “was thought 
to be impossible to know” until that fact was actually demonstrated by the independent functioning of 
its own circulatory and respiratory systems. Id. Therefore the common law courts said “in the 
contemplation of the law that a child who had not yet breathed with its own lungs, though born alive, 
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The issue of whether a person is “born alive” most often arises in 
determining whether prosecutors may bring homicide or manslaughter 
charges for fetal damage inflicted in utero.73 Although under the common 
law a conviction was possible only if the child was born alive, this is no 
longer the prevalent rule under state statutes.74 Previously, if the harmed 
fetus did not survive to birth, most state courts found that common law 
homicide statutes did not apply.75 Recently however, courts have provided 
that damage inflicted on a fetus in utero is sufficient to support a homicide 
charge even without a live birth.76 
At the federal level, feticide statutes are receiving growing attention.77 
Under the Unborn Victims of Violence Act,78 United States Attorneys can 
 
 
must still be dependent upon its mother for life, and, in this sense, its condition was still exactly like 
that of the fetus in utero.” Id.  
 73. During the past thirty years, courts have consistently concluded that the death of an infant 
who is born alive from injuries inflicted in utero constitutes homicide. See, e.g., Spencer, 839 F.2d at 
1341 (kicking and stabbing of mother resulting in death of infant ten minutes after birth was killing of 
“human being”); State v. Courchesne, 757 A.2d 699 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1999) (finding that a baby who 
had been born alive but who later died from injuries inflicted in utero when pregnant mother was 
stabbed was a “person” under murder statute); Ranger v. Georgia, 290 S.E.2d 63 (Ga. 1982) (holding 
that death of child, twelve hours after birth, caused by shooting of mother has sufficient to sustain 
conviction for felony murder of child); Illinois v. Bolar, 440 N.E.2d 639 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982) (finding 
that newborn surviving only long enough to exhibit a few heartbeats was an “individual” within 
meaning of manslaughter and reckless homicide statutes); Jones v. Kentucky, 830 S.W.2d 877 (Ky. 
1992) (holding that infant who died from prenatal injuries fourteen hours after birth was “person” 
within criminal homicide statutes); Williams v. Maryland, 561 A.2d 216 (Md. 1989) (stating that death 
of child seventeen hours after birth from arrow wound inflicted upon mother supported manslaughter 
conviction); New Jersey v. Anderson, 343 A.2d 505 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1975), rev’d on other 
grounds, 413 A.2d 611 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1980) (holding twins who died were within hours of 
birth persons within meaning of homicide laws); New York v. Hall, 158 A.2d 69 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1990) (holding infant who died forty-three hours after birth from injuries suffered by mother in car 
crash “individual” within the meaning of manslaughter statute).  
 74. For further discussion of the demise of the born alive rule, see Mary Lynn Kime, Hughes v. 
State: The “Born Alive” Rule Dies a Timely Death, 30 TULSA L.J. 539, 553-54 (1994), and Stephanie 
McCavitt, The “Born Alive” Rule: A Proposed Change to the New York Law Based on Modern 
Medical Technology, 36 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 609, 611 (1991). 
 75. See supra note 72 and accompanying text. 
 76. See infra note 80 and accompanying text. See also Hughes v. State, 868 P.2d 730 (Okla. 
Crim. App. 1994) (stating that the killing of an “unborn quick child” is manslaughter and the statute 
defines “quick child” to mean a viable child). 
 77. StateWatch, Los Angeles Times Looks At Growing Debate Over Fetal Rights Laws in States 
(May 29, 2001), at http://www.kaisernetwork.org/daily_reports/rep_index.cfm?DR_ID=4819 (last 
visited Jan. 9, 2003).  
 78. Unborn Victims of Violence Act of 2001, H.R. 503, 107th Cong. § 1841 (2001) [hereinafter 
UVVA]. On April 26th, 2001 the House of Representatives passed the UVVA by a vote of 252-172. 
Uphold the Right to Choose, Editorial (May 2, 2001) at http://www.hillnews.com/ 
050201/editorial.shtm (last visited Jan. 9, 2003). The majority of states already have laws similar to the 
UVVA and none has fallen to any constitutional challenge. See infra notes 82-84 and accompanying 
text. The UVVA does not distinguish crimes committed before viability and provides that “the term 
‘unborn child’ means a child in utero, and the term ‘child in utero’ . . . means a member of the species 
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charge individuals who commit an already defined federal crime of 
violence against a pregnant woman with a second offense on behalf of the 
second victim, the unborn child.79 Currently, the majority of states already 
have “unborn victim laws.”80 Additionally, some states promulgate 
homicide laws that recognize unborn children as victims, but only during 
part of the prenatal development.81 Furthermore, those states without 
 
 
homo sapiens, at any stage of development, who is carried in the womb.” H.R. 503 § 1841(d) 
(emphasis added).  
 79. H.R. 503 § 1841. 
 80. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-1103(A)(5) (West 1989 & Supp. 1998) (stating that the 
killing of an “unborn child” at any stage of prenatal development is manslaughter); ILL. COMP. STAT. 
CH. 720 §§ 5/9-1.2, 5/9-2.1, 5/9-3.2 (2000) (defining the killing of an “unborn child” at any stage of 
prenatal development is intentional homicide, voluntary manslaughter, or involuntary manslaughter or 
reckless homicide); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 14:32.5-14.32.8, read with §§ 14:2(1), (7), (11) (West 
1997) (stating that the killing of an “unborn child” is first degree feticide, second degree feticide, or 
third degree feticide); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 609.266, 609.2661-609.2665, 609.268(1) (West 1987) 
(stating that the killing of an “unborn child” at any stage of prenatal development is murder (first, 
second, or third degree) or manslaughter (first or second degree). It is also a felony to cause the death 
of an “unborn child” during the commission of a felony and the death of an “unborn child “ through 
operation of a motor vehicle is criminal vehicular operation. Id. at § 609.21 (West Supp. 2002); MO. 
ANN. STAT. §§ 1.205, 565.024, 565.020 (West Supp. 2002) (defining the killing of an “unborn child” 
at any stage of prenatal development as involuntary manslaughter or first degree murder); N.D. CENT. 
CODE §§ 12.1-17.1-01-12.1-17.1-04 (1997) (stating that the killing of an “unborn child” at any stage of 
prenatal development is murder, felony murder, manslaughter, or negligent homicide); OHIO REV. 
CODE ANN. §§ 2903.01-2903.07, 2903.09 (Anderson 1997 & Supp. 2002) (stating that at any stage of 
prenatal development, if an “unborn member of the species homo sapiens, who is or was carried in the 
womb of another” is killed, it is aggravated murder, murder, voluntary manslaughter, involuntary 
manslaughter, negligent homicide, aggravated vehicular homicide, and vehicular homicide); 18 PA. 
CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 2601-09 (1998) (establishing that the killing of an”unborn child” at any stage of 
prenatal development is first, second, or third-degree murder, or voluntary manslaughter); S.D. 
CODIFIED LAWS § 22-16-1, 22-16-1.1, 22-16-15(5), 22-16-20, and 22-16-41, read with §§ 22-1-2(31), 
22-1-2(50A) (Supp. 1998) (stating that the killing of an “unborn child” at any stage of prenatal 
development is fetal homicide, manslaughter, or vehicular homicide); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-201 et 
seq. (1999 § Supp. 2002) (requiring the killing of an “unborn child” at any stage of prenatal 
development to be treated as any other homicide); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 939.75, 940.01, 940.02, 
940.05, 940.06, 940.08, 940.09, 940.10 (1998) (establishing that the killing of an “unborn child” at any 
stage of prenatal development is first-degree intentional homicide, first-degree reckless homicide, 
second-degree intentional homicide, second-degree reckless homicide, homicide by negligent handling 
of dangerous weapon, explosives or fire, homicide by intoxicated use of vehicle or firearm, or 
homicide by negligent operation of vehicle).  
 81. See 1999 AR H.B. 1329 (West 1999) (stating that the killing of an “unborn child” of twelve 
weeks or greater gestation is murder, manslaughter, or negligent homicide); CAL. PENAL CODE 
§ 187(a) (West 2000) (establishing that the killing of an unborn child after the embryonic stage is 
murder); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.071 (West 1999) (illustrating that the killing of an unborn child after 
viability is vehicular homicide), FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.09 (West 2000) (defining the willful killing of 
an “unborn quick child” as manslaughter); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-80 (1999); § 40-6-393.1 (2001); 
and § 52-7-12.3 (1997) (stating that the killing of an “unborn child” after quickening is feticide, 
vehicular feticide, or feticide by vessel); Commonwealth v. Cass, 467 N.E.2d 1324 (Mass. 1984) 
(noting that the killing of an unborn child after viability is vehicular homicide); Commonwealth v. 
Lawrence, 536 N.E.2d 571 (Mass. 1989) (establishing that the killing of an unborn child after viability 
is involuntary manslaughter); MICH. COMP. LAW ANN. § 28.554 (West 1990) (defining the killing of 
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unborn victims laws criminalize particular conduct that terminates a 
human pregnancy or causes a miscarriage.82 A number of cases have 
challenged the constitutional validity of feticide statutes on the grounds of 
vagueness83 and violations of equal protection.84 However, all such 
 
 
an “unborn quick child” as manslaughter). The Supreme Court of Michigan has interpreted this statute 
to apply to only those unborn children who are viable. Larkin v. Cahalan, 208 N.W.2d 176 (Mich. 
1973); (A separate Michigan law, effective Jan. 1, 1999, provides felony penalties for actions that 
intentionally, or in wanton or willful disregard for consequences, cause a “miscarriage or stillbirth,” or 
cause physical injury to an “embryo or fetus.”); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-37 (2000) (defining the 
willful killing of an “unborn quick child” as manslaughter); NEV. REV. STAT. AM § 200.210 (1997) 
(defining the killing of an “unborn quick child” as manslaughter); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 713 
(West 1983) (defining the willful killing of an “unborn quick child” as manslaughter); The killing of 
an unborn child after viability is homicide. See Hughes, 868 P.2d at 730; R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-23-5 
(1994) (stating that the willful killing of an “unborn quick child” is manslaughter and the statute 
defines “quick child” to mean a viable child); The killing of an unborn child after viability is homicide. 
See State v. Horne, 319 S.E.2d 703 (S.C. 1984); State v. Ard, 505 S.E.2d 328 (S.C. 1998); TENN. 
CODE ANN. § 39-13-201, 39-13-202, 39-13-210, 39-13-211, 39-13-213, 39-13-214, 39-13-215 (1997 
& Supp. 2001) (defining the killing of an unborn child after viability as first-degree murder, second-
degree murder, voluntary manslaughter, vehicular homicide, and reckless homicide); WASH. REV. 
CODE ANN. § 9A.32.060(1)(b) (West Supp. 2000) (defining the killing of an “unborn quick child” as 
manslaughter).  
 82. See IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-1-6 (Michie 1994 & Supp. 1998) (stating that an individual 
who knowingly or intentionally “terminates a human pregnancy” commits feticide); IOWA CODE ANN. 
§ 707.8 (West Supp. 2002) (stating that an individual who intentionally “terminates a human 
pregnancy” without the consent of the pregnant woman commits a felony and also establishing other 
crimes involving the termination of a human pregnancy, such as during the commission of a forcible 
felony); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3440 (1995) (establishing that injury to a pregnant woman during the 
commission of a felony or misdemeanor which causes a miscarriage results in specific levels of 
offense severity). Also, injury to a pregnant woman through the operation of a motor vehicle which 
causes a miscarriage results in specific levels of offense severity. Id. at § 21-3441; N.H. REV. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 631:1-631:2 (1996) (stating that it is a felony to cause injury to another person that results in 
a miscarriage or stillbirth); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-3-7 (Michie 2002) (stating that it is a felony to 
injure a pregnant woman during the commission of a felony and cause her to suffer a miscarriage or 
stillbirth). It is also a crime to injure a pregnant woman through the unlawful operation of a vehicle 
which causes her to undergo a miscarriage or stillbirth. Id. at §§ 66-8-101.1 (Michie 2001); N.C. GEN. 
STAT. § 14-18.2 (2001) (stating that it is a felony to injure a pregnant woman during the commission 
of a felony and cause her to suffer a miscarriage or stillbirth. It is a misdemeanor to cause a 
miscarriage or stillbirth during a misdemeanor act of domestic violence); Va. CODE ANN. § 18.2-31 
(11) (Michie Supp. 2002) (stating that the premeditated killing of a pregnant woman with the intent to 
cause the termination of her pregnancy is capital murder). The unpremeditated killing of a pregnant 
woman with the intent to cause the termination of her pregnancy is also a crime. Id. at § 18.2-32.1. It is 
a felony to injure a pregnant woman with the intent to maim or kill her or to terminate her pregnancy 
when she is injured or her pregnancy is terminated. Id. at § 18.2-51.2; N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.00 
(McKinney 1998) (stating that under New York statutory law, the killing of an “unborn child” after 
twenty-four weeks of pregnancy is homicide). However, under a separate statutory provision, a 
“person” that is the victim of a homicide is statutorily defined as “a human being who has been born 
and is alive.” Id. at § 125.05. See also People v. Joseph, 496 N.Y.S.2d 328 (N.Y. County Ct. 1985); 
Gloria C. v. William C., 476 N.Y.S.2d 991 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1984); People v. Vercelletto, 514 N.Y.S.2d 
177 (N.Y. County Ct. 1987). 
 83. See, e.g., Smith v. Newsome, 815 F.2d 1386 (11th Cir. 1987) (concluding that the Georgia 
feticide statute was not unconstitutionally vague); People v. Henderson, 275 Cal. Rptr. 837 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1990) (upholding feticide statute against attack claiming it was for vagueness); Brinkley v. State, 
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challenges have failed.85 Moreover, several courts rejected the claim that a 
feticide statute applied to consensual abortion.86  
In Roe v. Wade,87 the Supreme Court held that a Texas criminal 
abortion statute prohibiting abortions at any stage of pregnancy except to 
save the life of the mother was unconstitutional.88 The Court opined that 
“prior to approximately the end of the first trimester, the abortion decision 
and its effectuation must be left to the medical judgment of the pregnant 
woman’s attending physician.”89 Furthermore, as the fetus approaches 
viability, the state may regulate abortion procedures in ways “reasonably 
related to maternal health,” and at the stage subsequent to viability, the 
state may “regulate, and even proscribe, abortion except where necessary 
in appropriate medical judgment for the preservation of the life or health 
of the mother.”90  
After the Court decided Roe, lower courts were left to interpret its 
holding and most adopted the view that the state could regulate abortion in 
the second trimester, but that it would be “absurd to construe a homicide 
statute as a tool to accomplish abortion regulation.”91 In addition, the 
Court determined that the “compelling” point, where a state’s important 
and legitimate interest in potential life arose, was at viability.92 According 
to the Court, a viable fetus presumably has the capability of meaningful 
life outside the mother’s womb and therefore, state protection of fetal life 
after viability has both “logical and biological justifications.”93 If the state 
 
 
322 S.E.2d 49 (Ga. 1984) (finding that a description of the unborn as the unborn child in the feticide 
statute is not unconstitutionally vague); State v. Merrill, 450 N.W.2d 318 (Minn. 1990) (holding that 
unborn child homicide statute was unconstitutionally vague after man killed woman and her one-
month old fetus). 
 84. Newsome, 815 F.2d at 1388; People v. Ford, 581 N.E.2d 1189 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (holding 
that the fetal homicide statute did not violate the equal protection clause as it neither affected a 
fundamental right nor discriminated against a suspect class and the imposition of criminal penalties 
bore a rational relation to the protection of the potentiality of life). 
 85. Wasserstrom, supra note 17, at 688. However, in line with the decision in Roe v. Wade, some 
feticide statutes require that the child was viable. Id. In many state cases, courts have held that “state 
manslaughter by abortion statutes construed as imposing a penalty only for the abortion of a viable 
fetus were constitutional” and that “the application of a penalty under an abortion statute without 
distinguishing based on viability rendered the statutory provision invalid.” Id. In a number of cases, 
courts determined that criminal abortion statutes did not apply to the homicide of an unborn child. Id.  
 86. Id. See also State v. Black, 526 N.W.2d 132 (Wis. 1994) (holding that feticide statute did not 
apply to consensual abortions). 
 87. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 88. Id.  
 89. Id. at 164. 
 90. Id. at 164-65. 
 91. Wasserstrom, supra note 17, at 687 (internal citation omitted). See also supra note 85. 
 92. 410 U.S. at 163. 
 93. Id. 
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wishes to protect a viable fetus, it may forbid abortion after the period of 
viability, “except when it is necessary to preserve the life or health of the 
mother.”94 Subsequent to the Roe decision, state courts have upheld 
convictions under general homicide statutes for the death of an unborn, 
viable fetus.95 In other jurisdictions however, the courts have held that 
prosecutors may maintain a conviction under general homicide statutes 
only if the legislature defines a fetus as a “person” or “human being” 
under the terms of the statute.96  
Not surprisingly, courts continue to debate over a parent’s legal 
obligation to protect fetal health. In 1931, the court in People v. Yates97 
resolved the issue of whether prosecutors could successfully charge a 
father with neglect of his unborn child. The father in Yates failed to 
furnish food, clothing, shelter, and other medical attendance to his unborn 
child’s mother.98 The court held that the father had a duty to provide these 
necessary things to ensure the health of his unborn child by providing 
them for the mother.99  
Almost seventy years later, the South Carolina Supreme Court in 
Whitner v. South Carolina,100 addressed whether the state could prosecute 
a mother for neglecting her unborn child. The unborn child’s mother 
ingested crack cocaine during her pregnancy and the state brought criminal 
neglect charges against her for her conduct.101 The Whitner court became 
the first high court of any state to hold that a viable fetus is a person within 
the meaning of its state child abuse laws.102 As a result of the Whitner 
 
 
 94. Id. at 163-64. 
 95. Wasserstrom, supra note 17, at 687. See also State v. Horne, 319 S.E.2d 703 (1984) (holding 
that in future cases the state may maintain an action for the murder of a viable fetus).  
 96. Wasserstrom, supra note 17, at 687. See State v. Holcomb, 956 S.W.2d 286 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1997); State v. Coleman, 705 N.E. 2d 419 (Ohio App. 3d 1997); Cuellar v. State, 957 S.W.2d 134 
(Tex. App. 1997). 
 97. People v. Yates, 298 P. 961 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1931).  
 98. Id. at 962. By failing to provide the mother with food, clothing, and shelter, the father 
constructively failed to provide the same to his unborn child.  
 99. Id. at 963. The court supported its conclusion by stating that “every child, while in gestation, 
needs the materials from which to form bone, tissue, nerves and the other components of its bodily 
structure.” Id. Without these things, the court articulated, it “cannot grow or develop, or even continue 
to live.” Id. “It can receive these materials directly only from its mother, but in a very real, though 
indirect, sense they come from the food which the mother consumes, and that food is necessary for the 
child, as well as the mother.” Id. It is also necessary for the child’s welfare that the father provide the 
mother “with clothing and shelter, at least so far as the lack of these things might materially impair her 
ability to supply her child with the life-giving and body-building materials which the unborn child 
must derive from her.” Id. The unborn child is “dependent on its father for food, clothing and shelter, 
and he is subject to criminal prosecution for failing to furnish them.” Id. 
 100. 492 S.E.2d at 777. See also supra note 25.  
 101. Id. at 778. 
 102. Coady, supra note 25, at 678 n.50.  
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holding, some commentators have argued that health and social services 
professionals must guess whether “a pregnant woman’s failure to obtain 
prenatal care, to quit smoking or drinking, to stop taking over-the-counter 
medicine, or to refrain from playing rigorous sports constitutes unlawful 
behavior.”103 Moreover, the dissent in Whitner criticized the majority for 
ignoring the “down-the-road” consequences of their holding,104 which 
might potentially render a pregnant woman criminally liable for a “myriad 
[of] acts.”105  
III. MEDICAL EFFECTS OF TERATOGENS ON THE DEVELOPING FETUS 
The medical community has long suspected that maternal drug use 
affects the fetus.106 Many drugs, both legal and illegal, have lasting effects 
on the health of a developing fetus.107 Of particular concern to the medical 
 
 
 103. Daniel N. Abrahamson et al., Amicus Curiae Brief: Cornelia Whitner v. The State of South 
Carolina, 9 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 139, 143 (1998).  
 104. 492 S.E. 2d at 788 (Moore, J., dissenting). 
 105. Id.  
 106. 1 ROBERT K. AUSMAN & DEAN E. SNYDER, AUSMAN & SNYDER’S MEDICAL LIBRARY 388 
(lawyers ed. 1988). 
 107. Id. According to Ausman and Snyder, the following drugs of abuse have varied affects on the 
developing fetus:  
 Cocaine and Methamphetamine: These drugs have been found to cause an increased 
miscarriage rate and prematurity rate and decreased intrauterine growth, as well as increased rate 
of placental abruption with stillbirth . . . [I]f cocaine or methamphetamine is discontinued during 
the second and third trimesters, many of the problems can be avoided . . . .  
 Marijuana: There is very little information on the effects of maternal marijuana use on the 
fetus and infant. In one study it was shown to have no effect of fetal birth weight nor prematurity 
rate. 
 Opiates (Methadone & Heroin): Infants of mothers who used heroin or methadone will 
initially show signs of acute narcotic withdrawal, including disturbed sleep [&] wake cycles, 
irritability, jitteryness, increased sucking and appetite, increased muscle tone and reflexes, 
vomiting, diarrhea, fever and seizures . . . . [C]hildren of mothers who used heroin or methadone 
have altered breathing patterns with an increased length and frequency of APNEA (spells without 
breathing). This has been implicated as the reason these infants are at increased risk of dying from 
Sudden Infant Death Syndrome (SIDS).  
 Phencyclidine (PCP): PCP is a drug with sedative and hallucinogenic properties. Maternal 
use of PCP during pregnancy is associated with irritability, poor attention, poor feeding and 
neurologic abnormalities, including abnormal movements and muscle tone, tremors, decreased or 
abnormal reflexes, hearing and eye movements.  
Id. at 389-90. Various prescription drugs also have varied affects on the developing fetus.  
 Anticoagulants (blood thinners): Exposure of the fetus [to the prescription drug Warfarin] 
may result in decreased growth of the nose and a bone abnormality . . . [] as well as brain 
abnormalities including decreased growth of the eye, mental retardation, delayed development, 
seizures and decreased growth of the brain. 
 Anticonvulsants (anti-epilepsy drugs): . . . A study of pregnant women with epilepsy who 
received treatment versus those who received no treatment showed that women [who treated their 
epilepsy had] twice the incidence of major [fetal] malformations such as cleft lip and palate, 
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community is the use by many pregnant women of tobacco,108 alcohol,109 
 
 
congenital heart disease and brain abnormalities . . . . [The use of the epilepsy drug Phenytoin 
during pregnancy] is associated with a distinct syndrome known as Fetal Hydantoin Syndrome 
(FHS). The features of FHS include abnormal growth and development prenatally and postnatally 
with intrauterine growth retardation, mental retardation and developmental delay, craniofacial and 
limb abnormalities and others. All anticonvulsant medications are associated with a defect in 
blood clotting which may lead to hemorrhage inside the baby’s head, chest or abdomen, of which 
one-third will not survive . . . .  
 Diazepam (Valium): When used by the mother during the last weeks of gestation, behavioral 
and brain chemistry changes are observed long after the drug has been excreted from the infant’s 
body [resulting in] decreased Apgar scores (a system for scoring the well-being of a newborn) 
secondary to decreased tone, difficulty with body temperature regulation, poor feeding, increased 
spells of apnea (no breathing) and decreased stress tolerance. 
 Local Anesthetics: Local anesthesia is used commonly during labor and delivery and] 
includes local injections for episiotomy and pudenal block and epidural anesthesia. The drug 
effects on the fetus are constriction of blood vessels and depression of the heart’s ability to 
contract. They cause a decreased fetal heart rate and intermittent decelerations on the fetal heart 
monitor. At one month of age, these babies were considered the more difficult and less socially 
responsive by their mothers.  
Id. at 390-93. 
 108. See Kristin L. Johnson, Comment, An Argument For Consideration of Prenatal Smoking in 
Neglect and Abuse Determinations, 46 EMORY L.J. 1661 (1997).  
 109. See James Drago, Note, One For My Baby, One For the Road: Legislation and Counseling to 
Prevent Prenatal Exposure to Alcohol, 7 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 163 (2001). See also DAN J. 
TENNENHOUSE, ATTORNEYS MEDICAL DESKBOOK § 23:45, FETAL ALCOHOL SYNDROME (3d ed. 
1993). Fetal alcohol syndrome (FAS) due to excessive alcohol intake during pregnancy may include 
some or all of the following findings: 
 1. Low birth weight and length.  
 2. Brain deficiency (microencephaly/failure of parts of the brain to develop).  
 3. Face anomalies (mid facial hypoplasia).  
 4. Diminished arousal.  
 5. Hyperactivity and tremulousness.  
 6. Delayed physical and mental development. 
 7. Developmental disabilities which do not improve with time.  
Id. See also TENNENHOUSE, supra note 109, at § 13:11.1 (Alcohol is toxic to the fetus during 
gestation).  
 Alcohol interferes with early development of organ systems in the first trimester, brain 
development in the second trimester, and retardation of fetal growth in the third trimester. It is also 
associated with spontaneous abortion. The degree of injury to fetal development is directly 
proportional to the amount of alcohol consumed, but defects may occur even with as little as one 
drink per day. Alcohol ingestion during pregnancy may cause one or more of a group of fetal 
defects called “fetal alcohol effects. If ingestion is heavy, a characteristic triad of severe defects 
may result called “fetal alcohol syndrome” which has been described as occurring at a frequency 
of 25 per 1000 live births among women with chronic alcoholism. It is the leading cause of mental 
retardation in the United States. The average IQ for persons with fetal alcohol syndrome is 67.  
 In heavy drinkers, alcohol intake can disrupt menstrual cycles and prevent early recognition 
of pregnancy. Damage from alcohol ingestion may occur as early as the third week of gestation. 
This is part of the reason for the high incidence of fetal alcohol syndrome among women of 
childbearing age with chronic alcoholism. As a result primary care physicians are being cautioned 
to screen for early pregnancy in this patient population. Fetal alcohol effects include one or more 
of the following:  
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and hard drugs such as heroin110 and cocaine.111 These drugs may produce 
 
 
a. Growth retardation before and after birth with low birth weight and shortened length.  
b. Brain defects and mental development deficits, including the following:  
 (1) Developmental delay/mental retardation.  
 (2) Micrencephaly (small brain).  
 (3) Poor coordination and motor skills.  
 (4) Hyperactivity.  
 (5) Irritability.  
 (6) Disturbances of sleep-wake patterns.  
 (7) Speech problems and delayed language acquisition.  
 (8) Learning disorders.  
 (9) Poor verbal comprehension and visual recognition.  
 (10) Attention deficits.  
 (11) Psychosocial relationship difficulties such as social withdrawal, inappropriate emotional 
responses, and failure to consider the consequences of actions.  
 (12) Conduct problems such as lying, cheating and stealing. 
c. Spinal defects such as spina bifida.  
d. Craniofacial defects including the following:  
 (1) Eye defects such as myopia, strabismus, and ptosis.  
 (2) Various face and jaw deformities.  
 (3) Dental malocclusion and other dental abnormalities.  
 (4) Hearing loss.  
e. Congenital heart disease, including the following: 
 (1) Septal defects.  
 (2) Great vessel defects. 
 (3) Tetralogy of Fallot.  
f. Kidney disorders such as hydronephrosis and hypoplastic (underdeveloped) kidneys.  
g. Hernias of the diaphragm, groin, and umbilicus.  
h. Skeletal defects, including the following:  
 (1) Congenital hip dislocation.  
 (2) Flexion contractures.  
 (3) Foot defects.  
 (4) Pectus excavatum and other abnormalities of the thoracic cage.  
 i. Strawberry hemangiomas. 
Fetal alcohol syndrome (FAS) is an extreme form of fetal alcohol effects. It is characterized by all 
the following:  
 (1) Central nervous system defects causing mental retardation. 
 (2) Craniofacial defects causing head and face deformities.  
 (3) Growth retardation 
Id. 
 110. TENNENHOUSE, supra note 109, at § 23:47 Opiates During Pregnancy (1993). Use of opiates 
may produce the following effects on the infant: 
1. Fetal death (especially if withdrawal occurred during pregnancy). 
2. Prematurity. 
3. Low birth weight. 
4. Irratability. 
5. Impaired motor skills. 
6. Poor ability to interact with others. 
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neonatal addiction and withdrawal symptoms, as well as permanent 
conditions such as central nervous system abnormality, mental and 
physical retardation, hyperactivity, and respiratory disorders.112 
Furthermore, intravenous drug use by pregnant women has exposed 
numerous unborn children to the AIDS virus, thus adding fuel to the 
growing fetal rights fire.113 
Teratogens are those substances that cause birth defects.114 Public 
awareness of the relationship between maternal drug use and its effects on 
the fetus has grown partly because of its association with the morning-
sickness drug Thalidomide, which causes limb reduction malformations in 
newborns.115 Surprisingly, drug use during pregnancy is common, with 
ninety percent of all pregnant women using at least one prescription 
medication.116 Although the long and short term effects of any particular 
drug on a fetus vary greatly depending on the stage of pregnancy when the 
woman takes the drug, the frequency of drug exposure, and the level of 
drug exposure,117 there is little doubt that drugs are hazardous to unborn 
 
 
7. Sudden infant death syndrome (SIDS). 
Id.  
 111. TENNENHOUSE, supra note 109, § 23:46 COCAINE DURING PREGNANCY (1993). Use of 
cocaine may produce the following effects on the infant: 
 1. Prematurity.  
 2. Low birth weight and length.  
 3. Abruptio placentae.  
 4. Irritability.  
 5. Visual disturbances.  
 6. Organ system malformations.  
 7. Intestinal infarctions.  
 8. Brain infarctions.  
 9. Sudden infant death syndrome (SIDS).  
10. Psychomotor impairment with loss of coordination. 
 112. Fleming, supra note 18, at 1085. 
 113. Id.  
 114. 49 AM. JUR. POF 2d 122 § 1 (explaining that a teratogen is a chemical agent that can cause 
birth defects). Several drugs have been proven teratogenic to the satisfaction of one or more courts. Id. 
at 133. Such drugs include Benedictin (anti-nausea medication taken by pregnant women, Delalutin 
(drug intended to prevent miscarriage), Ortho-Gynol (spermicide), and dietylstilbestrol (DES—“which 
may cause vaginal cancer in the daughters of DES mothers twenty years or more after intrauterine 
exposure”). Id. at 133-34. Drugs must be packaged with prescribed warnings. Id. at 134. The 
“Pregnancy Categories” A,B,C,D,X “range from no known risk in A to extreme and unjustifiable risk 
in X.” Id. A high percentage of prescription drugs have known teratogenic effects. Id. at 135. 
 115. 1 AUSMAN & SNYDER, supra note 106, at 388.  
 116. Id. On average, drug use consists of three to five medications. Id. One decade ago, eighty 
percent of all prescription medications were not approved for use during pregnancy. Id.  
 117. Nova D. Janssen, Note, Fetal Rights and the Prosecution of Women for Using Drugs During 
Pregnancy, 48 DRAKE L. REV. 741, 746 (2000) (citing NIDA Conference of Women and Drug Abuse, 
110 PUB. HEALTH REP. 517, 517-18 (1995)). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p1307 Cook Note book pages.doc 3/10/2003   6:27 PM 
 
 
 
 
 
1328 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 80:1307 
 
 
 
 
children.118  
The use of drugs during pregnancy is most problematic during the first 
eight weeks of gestation.119 At this time, the fetus is extremely susceptible 
to harm because its organs are beginning to form in shape and location and 
a disruption of this process may lead to major malformations.120 
Additionally, during this time of greatest susceptibility, the woman 
typically has not yet seen an obstetrician.121  
Drugs continue to have an impact on the fetus from the time of 
conception until birth,122 reaching the fetus by crossing the placenta.123 If 
the drug-exposed fetus survives, it may continue to experience problems 
later in life.124 This child will likely have a low birth weight, short birth 
length, and small head circumference.125 If the unborn child is repeatedly 
exposed to drugs in utero, it will often go through painful withdrawals that 
can cause physical damage, mental retardation, or death.126 The 
characteristics of withdrawal from both legal and illegal drugs include 
 
 
 118. Id. at 746 (citing JENNIFER R. NIEBYL, DRUG USE IN PREGNANCY 12 (2d ed. 1988)). 
 119. 1 AUSMAN & SNYDER, supra note 106, at 389. See also TENNENHOUSE, supra note 109, at 
§ 23:41 (stating that a fetus cannot excrete or metabolize drugs well due to immaturity of organs such 
as the liver and kidneys). Drug effects on the fetus depend on the length of gestation and the drug 
concentration. Id. The most vulnerable time is during the laying down of organ systems in the first 
eight weeks of gestation. Id.  
 120. 1 AUSMAN & SNYDER, supra note 106, at 389. See also TENNENHOUSE, supra note 109, at 
§ 23, EEFFECTS OF ABUSE SUBSTANCES TAKEN DURING PREGNANCY (1993) (highlighting specific 
effects such as: (1) Prematurity; (2) Abruptio placentae; (3) Low birth weight; (4) Neonatal drug 
withdrawal (including tachycardia and hyperactivity); (5) Abnormal neurological and behavior 
patterns; (6) Poor neonatal weight gain; (7) Increased infections and sudden infant death during the 
first year of life; and 8) Deformity). 
 121. 1 AUSMAN & SNYDER, supra note 106, at 389.  
 122. TENNENHOUSE, supra note 109, at § 23:44 (Most or all drugs in the maternal blood stream 
reach the fetus to some extent). Drugs most likely to enter the fetal circulation in high concentration 
are those which are lipid soluble, non-ionized, or have a low molecular weight. Id. Drugs which easily 
enter the brain by crossing the “blood-brain barrier” such as opiates, alcohol and cocaine also easily 
enter the fetal circulation by crossing the “placental barrier”. Id. The mother’s liver partly metabolizes 
drugs taken orally, whereas drugs taken intravenously, intranasally, or by inhalation reach the placenta 
in higher concentration. Id. 
 123. 1 AUSMAN & SNYDER, supra note 106, at 389. During this fetal period,” teratogenic effects 
are greatly decreased because all organs, except the nervous system, have been formed into shape.” Id. 
Drugs may cause abnormalities in the cell growth of these organs and may disrupt nervous system 
growth and development of function. Id. Labor and delivery is also critical because drugs that were 
“previously METABOLIZED . . . in the [mother’s] liver must now be broken down by the immature 
[fetus’] liver as well.” Id. The half-life of a drug in a newborn becomes greatly prolonged, sometimes 
ten-fold. Id. 
 124. Janssen, supra note 117, at 747 (citing Ira J. Chasnoff et al., Prenatal Drug Exposure: Effects 
on Neonatal and Infant Growth and Development, 8 NEUROBEHAV. TOXICOLOGY & TERATOLOGY 
357, 357-60 (1986).  
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. 
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restlessness, irritability, poor feeding habits, difficulty in bonding with 
parents or caregivers, and a higher likelihood of death from Sudden Infant 
Death Syndrome.127 
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL PRIVACY AND FETAL RIGHTS 
Historically, the United States’ legal system has treated the fetus as part 
of the woman, without any rights separate from her.128 The Supreme Court 
has “long held that the Constitution protects certain aspects of personal 
autonomy from state intervention” and has described the “right to be left 
alone” as “the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by 
civilized man.”129 In addition, the Court has described the right to be free 
from the government’s control of one’s physical person as the right to 
“personal privacy and dignity” and “bodily security and personal 
privacy.”130  
However, nowhere in the Constitution can one fine any explicit right of 
privacy.131 Nevertheless, the Court recognized for the first time that a 
constitutional right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or 
“zones or privacy,” existed in Pacific Railway v. Botsford.132 The issue in 
Botsford was whether, in a civil action for personal injury, the Court could 
order the plaintiff, without her consent, to submit to a surgical examination 
as to the extent of the injury for which she sued.133 The Court answered in 
the negative and reasoned that “the right of every individual to the 
possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint and 
interference of others” is the most “sacred” and “carefully guarded” 
right.134 
In a line of cases beginning with Griswold v. Connecticut,135 the Court 
has recognized the right to privacy in making reproductive decisions.136 
 
 
 127. Id.  
 128. Dawn F. Johnsen, The Creation of Fetal Rights: Conflicts with Women’s Constitutional 
Rights to Liberty, Privacy, and Equal Protection, 95 YALE L.J. 599 (1986). 
 129. Id. at 614-15 (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting)). 
 130. Id. (quoting Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (1985); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 
767 1966)). 
 131. Roe, 410 U.S. at 152. 
 132. Drago, supra note 109, at 166 (citing Pacific Railway v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250 (1891)). 
 133. Botsford, 141 U.S. at 251. 
 134. Id. However, the dissent argued that truth and justice are more sacred than any personal 
consideration and the courts may, in the interest of justice, require such personal examination to 
prevent wrong and injustice. Id. at 259 (Brewer, J., dissenting).  
 135. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 136. LARSEN, supra note 22, at 33.  
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The issue before the Court in Griswold was whether a Connecticut birth-
control statute was unconstitutional given the fact that the right of privacy 
is not explicitly protected under the Constitution.137 The Court found the 
statute, which criminally penalized “any person who uses any drug, 
medicinal article or instrument for the purpose of preventing 
conception[,]” an unconstitutional intrusion upon the right of marital 
privacy.138 The majority concluded that the right to marital privacy 
concerned a relationship lying within a “zone of privacy” created by 
several fundamental constitutional guarantees.139  
Ensuing Supreme Court decisions developed “the right to autonomy in 
reproductive and familial decisionmaking.”140 Although the issue of 
“marital privacy” was discussed in Griswold,141 the Court considered the 
issue of “individual privacy” in reproductive matters in Eisenstadt v. 
Baird.142 Specifically, the issue before the Supreme Court was whether 
providing dissimilar treatment for similarly situated married and 
unmarried couples violated the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Constitution.143 The Court resolved an issue left open in Griswold by 
stating that since the distribution of contraceptives to married persons 
 
 
 137. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 479.  
 138. Id. at 480. In Griswold, a licensed physician and professor at Yale Medical School, who 
served as Medical Director for the Planned Parenthood League of Connecticut, along with Griswold, 
the Executive Director of the League, were arrested and charged with “giving information, instruction, 
and medical advice to married persons” as a means of preventing contraception. Id.  
 139. Id. at 485-86. The Court held that a “governmental purpose to control or prevent activities 
constitutionally subject to state regulation may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily 
broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms.” Id. at 485 (quoting NAACP v. Alabama, 
377 U.S. 288, 307 (1964)). The Court further opined that it would be absurd to allow the police to 
search the “sacred precincts of marital bedrooms for telltale signs of contraceptives[.]” Id. Justice 
Douglas, writing for the majority, stated that the “penumbras” in the Bill of Rights created several 
“zones of privacy.” Id. at 484. For example the right of association contained in the penumbra of the 
First Amendment is a facet of that privacy. Id. at 483-84. The prohibition against the quartering of 
soldiers in a house during peacetime without consent is a privacy “right contained in the penumbra of 
the Third Amendment. Id. at 484. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers 
and effects, against unreasonable search and seizures” is explicitly affirmed by the Fourth 
Amendment. Id. The zone of privacy created by the Fifth Amendment in its Self-Incrimination Clause, 
prohibits the government from forcing a citizen to surrender to his detriment. Id. The Ninth 
Amendment further provides that “certain rights [enumerated in the Constitution] shall not be 
construed to deny or disparage other [rights] retained by the people.” Id.  
 140. LARSEN, supra note 22, at 33.  
 141. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 480, 486-87 (Goldberg, J., concurring). 
 142. 405 U.S. 438 (1972). In Eisenstadt, the Court overturned Baird’s conviction for exhibiting 
contraceptive articles during a lecture on contraception and for giving away vaginal foam to an 
unmarried person after the lecture. Id. at 440. Baird was convicted under a Massachusetts’s law that 
stated only licensed physicians were allowed to give away contraception, but only to married people. 
Id. at 441. 
 143. Id. at 447. 
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cannot be prohibited, the same should be true for single people.144 
Therefore, after Eisenstadt, the right of privacy in reproductive matters 
became not just a marital right but an individual right as well.  
The Court’s decision in Roe v. Wade, holding that a Texas statute 
prohibiting abortion was unconstitutional,145 was based on the conclusion 
that the decision to terminate a pregnancy fell within an individual’s zone 
of privacy.146 Despite the conclusion that a fetus is not a person under the 
Fourteenth Amendment,147 the Court nevertheless held that states have an 
“important and legitimate interest in protecting the potentiality of human 
life.”148 Courts have also held that the right to privacy includes the right to 
protect one’s autonomy from government interference (i.e., to protect the 
right to bodily integrity).149 Accordingly, courts generally protect a 
patient’s “autonomous” medical decisions even when the decision 
ultimately harms the patient.150  
Many hoped that Planned Parenthood v. Casey151 would overrule Roe 
 
 
 144. Id. at 453. The Court went on to state that “if the right of privacy means anything, it is the 
right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into 
matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.” Id.  
 145. See supra notes 91-99 and accompanying text (discussing holding in Roe v. Wade).  
 146. LARSEN, supra note 22, at 33.  
 147. As a result of this finding, federal courts have routinely held that a fetus is not a person on 
whose behalf a civil action may be commenced pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a deprivation of 
rights. Richard P. Shafer, Annotation, Fetus as Person on Whose Behalf Action May Be Brought 
Under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983, 64 A.L.R.FED. 886, 887 (2001).  
 148. Roe, 410 U.S. at 162.  
 149. Drago, supra note 109, at 168.  
 150. Id. (citing Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 284 (1990) (indicating that 
competent persons have a constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical 
treatment); Bee v. Greaves, 744 F.2d 1387 (10th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1214 (1985) 
(holding that a pretrial detainee retained a constitutional liberty interest in avoiding unwanted drug 
therapy, and that this interest could only be overcome in an emergency situation where no other less 
restrictive alternative exists); Osgood v. District of Columbia, 567 F. Supp. 1026 (D.C. 1983) (holding 
that a Christian Scientist patient’s right not to be given anti-psychotic drugs could be overcome only 
by a compelling state interest if there was no reasonable and less intrusive alternative); Pub. Health 
Trust v. Wons, 541 So. 2d 96 (Fla. 1989) (denying a hospital’s request for an order allowing 
administration of a life-saving blood transfusion based on religious reasons); In re Farrell, A.2d 404 
(N.J. 1987) (holding that a thirty-seven year-old competent, pregnant women with a terminal illness 
had a right to have her respirator removed, based on common law and constitutional principles which 
overrode state interests). 
 151. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). In Casey, abortion clinics and physicians 
challenged the constitutionality of five provisions of the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act. Id. at 
844. The Act required that a woman who wanted an abortion give her informed consent prior to the 
abortion procedure, and specified that she be provided with certain information at least twenty-four 
hours before the abortion is actually performed. Id. at 844. “For a minor to obtain an abortion, the Act 
requires the informed consent of one of her parents, but provides for a judicial bypass option.” Id. 
Another provision required that, unless certain exemptions applied, a married woman seeking an 
abortion must sign a statement indicating that she has notified her husband of her intended abortion. 
Id. In addition, the Act imposed reporting requirements on facilities that provide abortion services. Id. 
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v. Wade.152 However, although the Casey Court upheld the principles 
enumerated in Roe v. Wade, it held that the trimester system was not 
practicable, and found that the state may regulate abortions after fetal 
viability as long as there is not an “undue burden” on a woman who 
wishes to obtain an abortion.153  
The common theme throughout these cases is that the courts must 
always weigh the interests of the state in protecting “potential life”154 
against an individual’s right to privacy.155 One privacy right that would 
certainly be implicated by any fetal rights statute is the mother’s right to 
bodily integrity.156 Another privacy right is the right to independently 
make familial decisions, especially those relating to the prenatal care of an 
unborn child.157  
For a state to justify imposing regulations upon an individual’s 
conduct, it must exhibit a “compelling state interest.”158 To qualify as a 
“compelling state interest,” the state must meet three burdens.159 First, the 
asserted state interest must be important and legitimate.160 Second, the 
regulation must be substantially related to the goal as stated.161 Finally, the 
regulation must be the least intrusive means to achieve that end.162  
 
 
The Act exempted compliance with these requirements in the event of a medical emergency. Id. 
 152. See Drago, supra note 109, at 169.  
 153. Id. (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 874) See also supra note 42.  
 154. Some commentators assert that a potential life, or “future person,” has both the right to begin 
life with a sound mind and body, and the universal right not to be harmed. DEBORAH MATHIEU, 
PREVENTING PRENATAL HARM: SHOULD THE STATE INTERVENE? 27-28 (H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr. 
et al. eds., 1996). It is not an easy task to determine whether harm to a future person outweighs the 
degree of invasion to a pregnant woman. Id. at 59. The magnitude of harm, probability that harm will 
occur, and probability that the state can prevent or remove the harm, are all factors the state must 
weigh when infringing on a pregnant woman’s rights. Id. The question of magnitude of harm involves 
the extent that the mother’s conduct will harm the future child and the extent the state will harm her 
bodily decisions. Id. Furthermore, “there should be ample evidence that there is a high probability of 
serious harm to the future child if the state does not intervene.” Id. at 60. Finally, intervention only 
makes sense if there is a high probability that the state can actually prevent or ameliorate the harm. Id. 
A pregnant woman should not have to make futile efforts or subject herself to especially risky or 
experimental measures. Id.  
 155. See Drago, supra note 109, at 170. 
 156. LARSEN, supra note 22, at 33.  
 157. Id. (citing Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977).  
 158. See Drago, supra note 109, at 170.  
 159. Id.  
 160. Id.  
 161. Id.  
 162. Id. This framework was “established to prevent states from arbitrarily infringing upon 
protected liberty interests.” Id. “In addition, the behavior to be regulated must be clearly linked to the 
harm that the state is trying to prevent, and the harm must be likely and great.” Id.  
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V. ANALYSIS: SHOULD THE STATE INTERVENE DURING A WOMAN’S 
PREGNANCY? 
A. Advantages and Arguments in Favor of State Intervention During 
Pregnancy 
The rationale for protecting the unborn in tort law is simple: Justice 
demands recognition of a legal right of a child “to begin life unimpaired 
by physical, mental or emotional defects[.]”163 Furthermore, the law 
protects an unborn child in the descent and devolution of property when 
the child is later born.164 Because the areas of tort law and criminal law 
hold a third party liable for tortious acts committed against an unborn 
child, by analogy fetal rights laws should uniformly prescribe liability 
when a woman tortiously injures her unborn child.165 Moreover, the 
common law bears no indication that it would withhold from an unborn 
child its “processes for the purpose of protecting and preserving the person 
as well as the property of the child.”166 The analogy is clear then in tort 
law, for if the law protected an unborn child’s future property and not its 
future body, it would be “illogical, unrealistic, and unjust,” both to the 
child and to society.167 
State tort claims brought on behalf of children who are born alive, but 
later die as a result of prenatal injuries, are common.168 There is no doubt 
that one who tortiously causes harm to an unborn child should be subject 
to liability for the harm especially if the child is born alive.169 As the court 
in Whitner stated, “the consequences of [child] abuse or neglect which 
takes place after birth often pale in comparison to those resulting from 
abuse suffered by the viable fetus before birth.”170 It would therefore be 
 
 
 163. 62A AM. JUR. 2D Prenatal Injuries; Wrongful Life, Birth or Conception § 10. See, e.g., Cox 
v. Ct. of Common Pleas, 537 N.E.2d 721, 729 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988); Smith v. Brennan, 157 A.2d 497, 
504 (R.I. 1994); Hall v. Murphy, 113 S.E.2d 790, 793 (S.C. 1987). See also Berger v. Weber, 267 
N.W.2d 124, 126 (Minn. 1995) (a child may sue a tortfeasor for negligently inflicted prenatal injuries, 
since a child has a right to begin life with a sound mind and body); Keyes v. Construction Service, 
Inc., 165 N.E.2d 912 (holding that a manifest wrong should not go without redress). See also supra 
note 34 and accompanying text. 
 164. 62A AM. JUR. 2D Prenatal Injuries; Wrongful Life, Birth or Conception § 10.  
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. (citing Tucker v. Howard L. Carmichael & Sons, Inc., 65 S.E.2d 909, 911 (1951)).  
 167. Id.  
 168. See supra notes 43-47 and accompanying text. 
 169. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 869(1) (1979) (emphasis added). 
 170. Whitner, 492 S.E.2d at 780. See also supra notes 25, 98-103 and accompanying text.  
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“incongruous” to bar otherwise valid causes of action, simply because the 
tortfeasor was the unborn child’s mother.171  
In addition to tort law, there is little dispute that causing harm to a fetus 
during the commission of a federal felony should generally result in 
enhanced punishment, and courts have uniformly held that such 
enhancements are available under the current sentencing guidelines.172 
Currently, in an assault in which a mother and unborn child are both 
harmed, state laws recognize both the injury to the mother and the unborn 
child, as opposed to federal law, which recognizes only the harm to the 
mother.173 Under the Unborn Victims of Violence Act, however, the 
federal government could prosecute for harm to both victims.174 For 
example, if an assailant commits a federal crime that injures a woman and 
kills her unborn child, he could be prosecuted for two crimes: assault on 
the mother, and manslaughter or murder of the baby.175 Furthermore, 
several commentators argue that because the state may criminally convict 
a parent for subjecting a child to injury, so too should a woman be subject 
to criminal penalties for engaging in conduct that imposes injury on a 
fetus.176  
 
 
 171. Id. at 786.  
 172. For example, in both United States v. Peoples, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 27067, 3-4 (9th Cir. 
1997) and United States v. Winzer, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 29640, 2-3 (9th Cir. 1998), the courts held 
that assaulting a pregnant woman during a bank robbery could lead to a two level enhancement 
(approximately a twenty-five percent increase) under § 2B3.1(b)(3)(A) of the Guidelines relating to 
physical injury. In United States v. James, 139 F.3d 709, 714 (9th Cir. 1998), the court held that a 
pregnant woman may be treated as a “vulnerable victim” under § 3A1.1(b)(1) of the Guidelines, again 
leading to a two level sentencing enhancement for the defendant. And in United States v. Manuel, 
1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 14946, 5-6 (9th Cir. 1993), the court held that the defendant’s prior conviction 
for assaulting his pregnant wife warranted an upward departure from the applicable guideline range for 
his subsequent assault conviction. See also The “Unborn Victims of Violence Act:” United States 
Sentencing Commission before the Subcommittee on the Constitution of the House Committee on the 
Judiciary on H.R. 504th Cong. § 8140(a) (1999) (testimony of Ronald Weich, Former Special 
Counsel), available at http://www.house.gov/ judiciary/weic0721.htm (last visited Jan. 9, 2003). “The 
federal cases that already treat fetal injury as a relevant factor for establishing criminal liability or 
enhancing the defendant’s sentence are consistent with a much larger body of state cases.” Id. Indeed, 
these state cases, reveal that the issue of criminal liability for fetal injury is one that Anglo-American 
law long ago addressed and resolved in a common sense way. Id. “Several states, such as Georgia and 
Illinois, have enacted feticide statutes, but in other states the governing common law rule is that 
assaulting a pregnant woman and thereby causing the death of a viable fetus gives rise to criminal 
liability.” Id.  
 173. Supra note 78-79.  
 174. Id. 
 175. Id.  
 176. LARSEN, supra note 22, at 43. These commentators argue that the state should intervene 
before the woman injures her fetus. Id.  
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In the realm of medicine, the federal government has calculated that the 
average healthcare costs of a drug-exposed fetus total about one million 
dollars.177 When a woman exposes her fetus to drugs, hospital charges for 
the infant are almost four times greater than they are for drug-free 
infants.178 Commentators have therefore urged that the state should 
provide adequate medical care for fetuses that will be brought to term.179 
In accordance with this belief, President George W. Bush recently 
announced a plan that would allow states to provide prenatal care to low-
income women, thus recognizing the right of a fetus to receive adequate 
medical care.180 
Addressing constitutional issues, fetal rights advocates argue that a 
pregnant woman’s use of tobacco, alcohol, and illicit drugs are not 
“fundamental rights” under the Constitution.181 Furthermore, states may 
prohibit post-viability abortions “except where necessary to protect the 
health and life” of the woman.182 Therefore, after a fetus reaches viability, 
the state should be permitted to prohibit a woman from engaging in certain 
types of maternal conduct that harms the child.183 Thus, the state should 
have the right to restrict a pregnant woman’s use of these substances when 
such use presents a serious risk of harm to her unborn child.184 In other 
words, the greater the probability of harm to the unborn child, the greater 
the right the state has to intervene.185 Advocates of state intervention argue 
that the child has an interest not to be injured, and this outweighs a 
woman’s interest in using both illegal and legal drugs during pregnancy.186 
Moreover, as the plurality in Webster noted, the state has a compelling 
state interest in protecting potential human life throughout the woman’s 
pregnancy.187 Thus, the state has a compelling interest in protecting the 
health of potential life just as it has a compelling interest in preserving the 
life itself.188 
 
 
 177. Nancy Kubasek, The Case Against Prosecutions for Prenatal Drug Use, 8 TEX. J. WOMEN & 
L. 167 (1999).  
 178. Califano, supra note 21. 
 179. Supra note 19. 
 180. Id. 
 181. LARSEN, supra note 22, at 43. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id.  
 187. Webster, 492 U.S. at 519-20. See also supra note 42.  
 188. Webster, 492 U.S. at 519-20. 
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B. Disadvantages of State Intervention During Pregnancy 
There is a long-range economic burden when the state incarcerates 
women instead of treating them.189 In addition, women in prison “face 
conditions hazardous to fetal health, including overcrowding, poor 
nutrition, and exposure to contagious disease.”190 Moreover, prenatal care 
in prison health facilities is generally nonexistent.191 For incarcerated 
mothers with drug histories, the sudden withdrawal of their drug supply 
may bring about physiological changes that may ultimately endanger both 
the mother and the child.192 
Additionally, because drug use during pregnancy is common,193 the 
legal system may not be able to handle the large amount of prosecutions—
there may not enough jail cells, prosecutors, or courts.194 Another concern 
is that the prosecution of pregnant mothers may “turn obstetricians into 
full-time witnesses.”195 Moreover, even if the state places a pregnant 
mother in jail, illicit drugs may still be readily available196 and 
consequently, there may be no guarantee that the drug use will ever cease 
once a woman is incarcerated.197 
Commentators also note that criminalizing prenatal behavior that 
endangers the health of a fetus may lead to absurd, unintended, and 
dangerous results.198 For example, there may be a breach in the doctor-
patient relationship if the physician must report any activity that may 
endanger the welfare of a fetus.199 Furthermore, at the time when a fetus is 
most susceptible to drug exposure, a woman may not know she is 
pregnant.200 Moreover, if a pregnant woman, who is addicted to a drug 
 
 
 189. Heather Flynn Bell, Comment, In Utero Endangerment and Public Health: Prosecution vs. 
Treatment, 36 TULSA L.J. 649, 658 (2001).  
 190. Enid Logan, The Wrong Race, Committing Crime, Doing Drugs, and Maladjusted for 
Motherhood: The Nation’s Fury Over “Crack Babies,” 3/22/99 SOC. JUST. 115 (1999), available at 
1999 WL 25869921 (internal quotations omitted).  
 191. Id. 
 192. Id.  
 193. See supra notes 21 and 116 and accompanying text. 
 194. LARSEN, supra note 22, at 44.  
 195. Id. 
 196. Logan, supra note 190.  
 197. Id.  
 198. Supra note 40.  
 199. See Cheryl M. Plambeck, Divided Loyalties: Legal and Bioethical Considerations of 
Physician-Pregnant Patient Confidentiality and Prenatal Drug Use, 23 J. LEGAL MED. 1, 21-28 
(2002).  
 200. 1 AUSMAN & SNYDER, supra note 106, at 389.  
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harmful to her fetus, knows that she may be subject to criminal charges if 
she seeks prenatal care, she may opt for an abortion or may avoid seeking 
the prenatal care altogether.201 
Finally, additional criminal penalties do not address the problems 
underlying drug addiction.202 To a large extent, drug addition is a 
socioeconomic problem and any solution that does not address the factors 
that have created the problem in the first place will most likely fail.203  
Thus, criminalization may not have the desired effect necessary to 
outweigh the intrusion on a mother’s constitutional rights.204 As one 
observer noted, “it is an addicted woman who becomes pregnant, not a 
pregnant woman who becomes addicted.”205 
VI. FETAL RIGHTS CENTERED PROPOSAL: TREATMENT FIRST, 
CRIMINALIZATION LATER 
Any attempt to increase legal protection for unborn children will have 
to balance the pregnant woman’s constitutional rights on one hand against 
the state’s interest in protecting the potential life of a fetus, on the other.206 
Any statute creating rights in a fetus to be free from maternal abuse will 
certainly be subject to strict scrutiny because it will infringe on the 
woman’s right of privacy and interest in maintaining bodily integrity.207 
Therefore, if the state wishes to regulate a pregnant woman’s actions, it 
must do so skillfully. To survive a constitutional challenge, any statutes 
must be narrowly tailored to preserve family units, protect maternal rights, 
and limit state intervention to those instances where there is no alternative 
way to protect the child.208 
The United States’ legal system has fully developed tort law in terms of 
allowing a born alive fetus recover for prenatal injuries inflicted upon it by 
third parties.209 For example, imagine a drunk driver who smashes a car 
 
 
 201. LARSEN, supra note 22, at 44. 
 202. Id. For instance, there are currently insufficient drug treatment programs developed for 
pregnant mothers. Id.  
 203. Id. 
 204. Id.  
 205. Kathryn T. Jones, Note, Prenatal Substance Abuse: Oregon’s Progressive Approach to 
Treatment and Child Protection Can Support Children, Women, and Families, 35 WILLAMETTE L. 
REV. 797, 797 (1999) (citing Hearing on H.B. 2388 Before the House Judiciary Comm. on Family, 
66th Leg. (Or. Mar. 11, 1991) (Exhibit A: Howard Klink, Multnomah County Department of Human 
Services, Position Paper, Prenatal Drug Testing)). 
 206. See LARSEN, supra note 22, at 31 
 207. Id. at 32. See also Part IV and accompanying text.  
 208. Id.  
 209. Id.  
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into a wall. As a result of this crash a pregnant woman dies. However, her 
viable unborn child survives but the crash has left him or her permanently 
handicapped. Current tort law may allow the fetus to recover if a third 
party caused its prenatal injuries.210 Justice demands the fetus should 
recover, even if its mother was the drunk driver who crashed the car into 
the wall.211 
In the civil context, if a woman intentionally or negligently harms her 
fetus, then the woman should be liable for damages to her fetus, born or 
unborn, viable or not viable. Negligence could be expressed as “failing to 
take reasonable steps to ensure her fetus is born in good health.”212 
Because courts have progressively held third parties to a standard of care 
when dealing with a pregnant woman, it is time to also hold pregnant 
women to the same standard of care that other reasonable pregnant women 
would do to their bodies and their fetuses.  
In the realm of criminal law, courts may protect the fetus from third 
persons, and these protections are constitutionally justifiable.213 From the 
standpoint of the fetus as a “future person,”214 it makes sense to prosecute 
a third party attacker for stabbing a pregnant woman in her abdomen. 
Taking the “future person” argument one step further, it also makes sense 
to prosecute a woman, who has decided not to exercise her constitutional 
right to an abortion, for inflicting these injuries herself in order to kill her 
fetus, especially if the unborn child was born alive and later died.  
A model criminal statute should avoid the antiquated “born alive” 
requirement, issues of viability, and should not exempt maternal conduct. 
It may resemble the following: when injury or death to an unborn child 
was intentional or resulted from willful misconduct or an evil mind, 
whether or not characterized as malice, the applicable criminal penalty 
shall apply. It should not, and indeed it is time for the law to recognize, 
that it does not matter who kills the unborn child of a woman who has 
decided to carry her child to term.  
Proven scientific data details how drugs affect the developing fetus.215 
If the judicial system can hold a doctor civilly liable for damages inflicted 
upon the fetus or upon the mother before she conceives as recoverable,216 
 
 
 210. Id.  
 211. See supra note 36.  
 212. ETHICAL ISSUES IN MATERNAL-FETAL MEDICINE, supra note 34, at 134.  
 213. See supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text. 
 214. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.  
 215. See supra Part III. 
 216. Supra note 34.  
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then courts should allow a fetus to recover for injuries resulting from the 
mother’s abuse of drugs, or negligent use of drugs while pregnant.  
Once a woman has exercised her constitutional right to carry her child 
to term, she must accept the consequences of that choice. One 
consequence is the legal duty to prevent harm to the child, exactly as if the 
child were born and alive. The argument that the woman has a 
constitutional right to privacy fails because a woman is not only affecting 
her body she is affecting her “future child’s” body. Of course, fetal rights 
proponents will never be able to sway those who believe that a fetus is not 
a “future person.” Admittedly, there exists much variation, and there are 
many gray areas, within the spectrum of exactly what constitutes a “future 
person.” On one end of the spectrum is the healthy one-day-from-being-
born “fetus” on the other end is the one-day-old embryo. However, fetal 
rights opponents simply need to use common sense to be able to hold that 
both of these “future persons” should be protected.  
VII. CONCLUSION 
Fetal abuse laws targeted toward pregnant mothers will work. First, the 
state must encourage pregnant mothers who abuse drugs and have yet to 
attempt rehabilitation to do so. Because abortion is rightly legal, the 
concern must not be with how many abortions women are having. Instead, 
the state’s concern must sincerely lie with ensuring the health and well 
being of those future children. Importantly, legislators and courts cannot 
strike fear into the pregnant woman, prompting an avoidance of prenatal 
care altogether or an increase in the incidents of abortions and abandoned 
babies.217  
The goal is to protect the fetus, but not at all costs. The mother has 
rights (which are limited once she becomes pregnant and decides to forego 
an abortion) that the state must always protect. This protection should 
come in the form of increased treatment facilities, deterrence options that 
avoid prison as punishment, and focus more on counseling and community 
service projects to educate newly pregnant women of the dangers of fetal 
abuse, and leniency on the part of state legislators who wish to punish 
even more poor, uneducated women.  
There is no doubt that the maternal duty to protect the health of her 
unborn child will be the subject of much controversy for some time. As 
one court recently noted, “the extent to which the unborn child is to be 
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accorded the legal status of one already born is one of the most debated 
questions of our time[.]218”  
Moses Cook∗ 
 
 
 218. Commonwealth v. Jeffery Robert Booth, 766 A.2d 843, 845 (Pa. 2001) (quoting People v. 
Greer, 402 N.E.2d 203, 208 (1980)). 
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